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DISCOVERING DISCOVERY: NON-PARTY
ACCESS TO PRETRIAL INFOR
TION IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS 1938-2006
.

.

SEYMOUR MOSKOWITZ*

In the modern era, the pretrial process is critical to the
disposition of almost all litigation. The vast majority of
cases never go to trial. Those which are contested at trial
and upon appeal are often decided upon the results of the information gather before trial. This is true in both private
litigation and in public interest cases where 'private attorneys general" may only function effectively with courtenforced discovery. Despite the significance of the Article III
courts to our society, transparency in their processes for resolving civil disputes has been severely compromised.
Threats to openness emanate from multiple sources.
This article considers the legal history and case law of one
aspect of openness in th.e federal .courts: public access to discov.ery material gathered by parties engaged .in federal litigation. The public, the press, researchers, and various others
have legitimate interests in this information. This right
should include pretrial material unprotected by valid protective orders issued under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
INTRODUCTION

De Tocqueville noted in the 1840's that law, lawyers and
the legal system are peculiarly central in·g re.d ients in the functioning of American democracy. "Scarcely any political question
arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later,
into a judicial question."l Major public policy issues are rou-

*

Seymour Moskowitz, B.A., Columbia University; J.D. Harvard Law
School; Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. My thanks to Professor Tom Rowe, Duke Law School, for guidance and inspiration on this project;
to John Isheta, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, and Warren
Reese, Research Librarian, Notre Dame Law School, for help in locatjng and providing important documentary materials; to Kevin Warren, Anna Schumaker, and
Amy Levin, VUSL Class of 2006, for their outstanding research assistance.
1.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 290 (Henry Reeve ed.,
.

'

.

. . . . . -.....·ITY OF COLORADO IAW REVIEW

818

.

[Vol. 78

tinely decided within the context of civil litigation in the United
States. Brown v. Board of Education2 and its progeny are classic examples. More recent battles have included: the liability of
tobacco companies to smokers and to governments for s.moking
related illnesses,3 damages to consumers of pharmaceutical
products, the lethal combination of Ford Explorer vehicles and
Bridgestone/Firestone tires, and corporate governance issues
4
impactin.g entire. industrie.s.
In the modern era, the pretrial process is critical to the
disposition of almost all litigation. The vast majority of cases
never go to trial. Those which are contested at trial and upon
appeal are often decided upon the results of the information
gathered before trial. This is true in both private litigation and
in public interest cases where "private attorneys general" may
only function effectively with court-enforced discovery. 5
Despite the significance of the Article III courts to our soci·
ety, transparency_ in their processes for resolving civil disputes
has been severely compromised. Threats to openness emanate
from multiple sources. While civil trials are normally open to
the public and the press,6 only a minute number of the cases
•

Vintage Books 1945) (1795).
2.
347 u.s. 4.83 (1954).
3.
See generally CARRICK MOLLENKAMP ET AL., THE PEOPLE VS. BIG
TOBACCO: HOW THE STATES TOOK ON THE CIGARETTE GIANTS (1998).
4.
See, e.g., Mark Curriden, Power of 12, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2001, at 36 (cataloging and describing litigation involving Fen-phen, Tylenol and other drugs, HMOs;
children's pajamas, and numerous other cases forcing businesses and government
to change the way they operate).
5.
At the federal level, Patrick Higginbotham has observed:
Congress has elected to use the private suit, private attorneys·general as
an enforcing mechanism: for the-anti-trust laws, the security laws, envi·
ronmentalla ws, civil rights and more. In the main, the plaintiff in these
suits must discover his evidence from the defendant. Calibration of discovery is calibration of the level of enforcement of the social policy set by
Congress.
Patrick Higginbotham, Foreward, 49 ALA. L. REV. 1,. 4-5 (1997).
.
6.
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly extended the First
Amendment right of access to civil proceedings, it has acknowledged a history of
access, and lower courts actually have recognized such a right. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17 (1980) ("Whether the public has a
right to attend trials of civil cases is a question not raised by this case, but we
note that historically both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively
open."); see, e.g., Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1073-74 (3d Cir~
1984) (holding that in corporate proxy litigation, the district court should not have
denied the public, including two newspaper companies; access to portions of a
hearing and its transcripts based on both common law and a constitutional right
of public access to civil trials).
.
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entering the federal court system are tried. 7 The vast bulk of
cases are resolved by negotiated settlements· often not filed in
court at all, or filed and sealed8 or decided by dispositive pretrial motions.9
Since 1980, little-noticed procedural rule
c'h anges have made the most important p·a rts of the discovery
process a private preserve. Aggregation of similar cases 10 and
multi-district litigation increase the significance of these
trends .
In addition, increasingly numerous alternate dispute resolution (''ADR") processes e.g., court ordered mediation andlor
arbitration operate outside public view or knowledge. II These
mechanisms often keep disputes from entering the c.o urt system. Contractually enforced ADR, including consumer or employment complaints, can hide patterns of abuse by a corporation or an entire industry.l2 These and other processes rob the
Paul W. Mollica, Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L.
REV~ 141, 141 (2000) ("The percentage of civil cases proceeding to trial in the federal courts plunged from 8.5%. of all pending civil cases in [1973] to just 2.3% in
[1999]."); see also Hope Viner Samborn, The Vanishing Trial, A.B~A. J., Oct. 2002,
at 24, 26 (comparing ten percent of civil cases filed in 1970 that resulted in trial
with 2.2% in 2001).
8.
One insurance defense attorney noted he had not "put a settlement together in the past five to six years tha,t [lacked] a confidentiality clause.'; Blanca
Fromm, Comment: Bringing SeUlement Out of the Shadows.: Information About
Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 663, 676 (2001) (quoting
California lawyer Glenn Gilsleider).
9.
Mollica, supra note 7~ at 143-44 (reviewing twenty volumes of the Federal
Reporter from 1973 and from 1997-98 and reporting a marked increase in summary dispositions of civil cases).
I 0.
See Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical
Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in /lelated Laws.u its, 50 DUKE L.J.
381 (2000) (describing formal and informal methods of aggregating claims and de·
fenses of related cases).
11.
ADR emerged in the 1970's in both optional and mandatory forms. In
1978, Congress approved three court-annexed arbitration programs for federal
district courts. See Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected
ADR: A Critique of Federal Court Annexed Arbi.t ration Programs, 141 U. PA. L .
REV. 2169, 2172 (1993). The Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act
(JIAJA) established a general structure for the federal court-annexed arbitration
program. ld. at 2177. In these proceedings, the federal rules of evidence are inapplicable, and there is no requirement that arbitrators issue findings of fact or
conclusions of law. Id. at ·2181. If a party in arbitration fails to request a trial
within thirty days of the arbitrator's decision, the conclusions bear the same force
as a trial judgment and may not be appealed. Id. at 2185. Most districts also require the party requesting a trial to post bond for the arbitrator~s fees and .c osts.
Id. at 2183.
12.
See Corporate Responsibility: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, 108th Cong. 19 (2002) (statement of Joan Claybrook, Presi·
7.

4
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public of a crucial function of the judicial process: bringing to
light issues of vital public interest that could otherwise be hid·
den from view by powerful private parties)3 The effects of
these developments have been profound.
This article considers the legal history and case law of another aspect of ope.n ness in the federal courts: public access to
discovery material gathered by parties engaged in federal litigation. The public, the press, researchers, and various others
have legitimate interests in this information absent considerations warranting the entry of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
2614 protective order. In Nixon v. Warner Communications,
Inc.,I5 the Supreme Court recognized a right to inspect and
copy public records and documents. This right should include
pretrial material unprotected by valid Rule 26 prote,c tive orders. Underlying this right are important policies. ensuring
public health and safety, promoting public respect for the judicial process, and assuring that judges perform their duties in
an honest and informed manner.I6 Unelected and given life
tenure, federal judges are only truly accountable. through public and professional scrutiny of their decisions.
Although courts have a number of internal checks, such as
appellate review by multi-judge tribunals, professional and
public monitoring is an essential feature of democratic controL Monitoring both provides judges with critical views of
their work and deters arbitrary judicial behavior. Without
monitoring, moreover, the public could have no confidence
in the conscientiousness, reasonableness, or honesty of judi. l procee d.1ngs. 17
c1a

A close examination of the history of Rule 5 and the case
law surrounding public access reveals a complicated set of legal

dent~

Public Citizen, testifying that financial companies were forcing ,c onsumers to
arbitrate claims of securities fraud, hiding widespread abuse by the industry).
13.
See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
14.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (Hereinafter, specific rules will be referred to as ''Rule

__'").;

15.
435 u.s. 589, 597 (1978).
16.
Republic of the Phillipines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 660,
664 (3d Cir. 1991).
17.
United States v. Amodeo; 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995). See also
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 502 (1st Cir. 1989) (without access
to documents that lead to "full understanding" of a proceeding, public would not
be in a "position to serve as an effective check on the system").
'
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principles and an evolving jurisprudence. Part I discusses the
significance of access to information obtained through discovery. This section examines the value of having third parties
obtain pretrial materials and the interests of litigants, particularly defendants, in shielding such information from public
view. Part II examines the history of the development of modern discovery in the federal courts. In 1938, the newly-created
Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure
(''FRCPu)
provided
the
oppor.
tunity to obtain relevant information before trial concerning
claims and defenses. Beginning in the 1970s, cross-cutting
trends, often based upon a perception of "discovery abuse"18
substantially limited these opportunities. Part III relates the
history of Rule 5, specifically focusing on the requirement to
file discovery materials in court. The little noticed 2000
amendment to Rule 5 now prohibits filing discovery except
upon specific court order, reversing the prior position of that
Rule. Part IV surveys federal case law pertaining to public access to pretrial information during the _p eriods when Rule 5 re ..
fleeted these various filing requirements. In addition, this section examines federal court response to access arguments
based upon common law or First Amendment claims. The Article concludes with a recommendation that Rule 5 should return to its pre-2000 form, requiring filing of discovery material
except where a court relieves the parties of this obligation. Not
only would this encourage balanced procedural decision. making on access something Rule 26 protectiv-e order jurisprudence already requires but also protect the interests of unrepresented parties and the public.

See American Bar Ass'n, ABA Litigation Section Special Committee on
Abuse of Discovery: Report to the Bench and Bar, 92 F.R.D. 137 (1977) (recommending limits on scope of discovery use of various discovery devices, and more
judge·managed discovery); Richard L. Marcus, Retooling American Discovery for
the Twenty·First Century: Toward a New World Order?, 7 TUL. J. INT;L & COMP.
L., 153t 161-62 (1999) (surveying post·1970 efforts at discovery containment).
18.

[Vol. 78
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I.

ACCESS TO INFORMATION GATHERED DURING PRE-TRIAL

PROCEDURES

As far back as 1933, asbestos claims were routinely sealed
by courts upon request of defendants, depriving workers and
others of knowledge of preventable injuries. 19 In cases involving drugs and defective products, the dissemin.a tion of vital information relevant to public health and safety has often been
blocked.2o In January 2002, the Boston Globe reported that for
more than ten years, the Archdioces.e of Boston secretly settled
child molestation claims against at least seventy priests.21 Af~
ter the Boston Globe published its investigative report, hundreds of new victims came forward and reports across the country surfaced of priests' sexual abuse and misconduct.22
Bridgestone and Firestone employed judge-enforced confidentiality orders in cases across America to hide information about
injuries and deaths linked with the tread separation of their
tires. As a result, for nearly a decade, the public and government agencies had little inkling· of the issue and consumers
continued to buy the potentially deadly tires. 23
•

•

19.
TRIAL

PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON

113 et seq. (1985) {describing the aftermath of early asbestos settlements);
Coalition for Consumer Rights, Secrets that Kill: Dangers Buried in the Courthouse, Mar. 2000.
20.
See Courts Secrecy, Its Impact on Public Health and Safety, and the-Sunshine in Litigation Act: Hearing on S. 1404 Before the S. Judiciary Comm. on
Courts and Administrative Practice, 103d Cong. (1994) (detailing consequences of
denying public access to discovery in, and settlement of, cases involving the Shiley
heart value, Prozac_"and numerous other products).
21.
Walter V. Robinson, Scores of Priests Involved in Sex Abuse Cases Settlements Kept Scope of Issue Out of Public Eye, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31, 2002, at Al.
22.
Walter V. Robinson, Hundreds Now Claim Priest Abuse, Lawyers Report
Flood of Alleged New Victims, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 24, -2 002, at Al; Brooks Egerton & Reese Dunklin, Bishops' Record in Cases of Accused Priests, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, June 12, 2002, at 24A (reporting accusations of pedophilia, sexual abuse, or harassment by priests in forty-one states).
23.
Between 1992 and 2000, 271 people died in accidents linked to Ford Explorer/Firestone Tire failure and more than 800 were seriously injured. See Class
Act-ion Status Given to Ford and Firestone Suits, N.Y. TIMES; Nov. 29, 2001, at C4.
For more than eight years, Bridgstone/Firestone Tires had been negotiating confidentiality agreements with respect to information regarding the lethal combination of the Ford Explorer Sport Utility Vehicles and its tires. See, e.g., Sealed
Court Records Kept Tire Problems Hidden, USA TODAY, Sept. 19, 2000, at 16A.
Many of the individual cases were transferred to the Indiana District Court handling these consolidated cases and an agreement requiring secrecy was required of
anyone wishing to share in the discovery. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 198
F.R.D. 654, 657 (S.D. Ind. 2001). Eventually the discovery documents were leaked
.

.
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Among the common problems in these and other cases is
the lack of access to materials gathered in discovery and the
secret settlements of cases involving a wide variety of legal
wrongs.24 While courts undoubtedly exist to resolve disputes
between private parties,25 the judicial branch is an integral
public institution, no more or less so than the executive or legislative branches. Therefore, the work of courts should be open
unless specific and compelling reasons exist to draw a curtain
in front of their operations. Only an open judicial branch can
preserve public trust and foster effective monitoring.26 The
Supreme Court has noted "[p]eople in an open society do not
demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for
them to accept w'h at they are prohibited from observing."27
Moreover, many cases in American courts have a distinctly
public nature. As Judge Posner has noted, "[t]he parties to a
lawsuit are not the only people who have a legitimate-interest
in the record compiled in a legal proceeding/'28 This public na-

to the press and showed how many tire/tread separations had been reported to
Firestone. See Keith Bradsher,. Documents Show Firestone Knew of Rising Warranty Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2000, at Cl. The secrecy enforced with respect to
discovery and settlement delayed the recall of these tires for years. See Thomas
A. Fogarty, Can Courts' Cloak of Secrecy Be Deadly?, USA TODAY, Oct. 16, 2000,
at lB.
24.
With respect to secret settlements, see S.C. FED. DIST. LOCAL R. 5.03;
Laurie Kratky Dore~ Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in
the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAM:E L. REV. 283 (1999).
25.
Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality~ Protective Orders, and Public Access to
the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 428, 431 (1991) (contending court's "primary mission" is to resolve disputes among litigants); Richard L . Marcus, The Discovery
Confidentia.l ity Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 469-70 (1991) (arguing
primary role of courts is to resolve disputes and decide cases, not to "give expression to 'public values"').
26.
Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (recognizing a
general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial
records and documents); In re Consumers Power Co. Sec. Litig., 109 F .R.D. 45
(E.D. Mich. 1985).
Access to pretrial documents furthers several important functional goals
of society. Court proceedings can be evaluated by individuals who are informed about the issues. Access to pretrial documents lessens the likeli·
hood of private or public graft or judicial ignorance. Pretrial access to information helps the p.ublic better understand judicial proceedings and
public confidence in the judicial system as a whole can be enhanced.
These functional needs of society must be balanced against the func·
tional needs of the judicial system. As a result, the scope of public access
may need to be narrowed and its timing deferred.
Id. at 54.
27.
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia~ 448 U.S. 555, 57.2 (1980).
28.
Citizens First Nat'l Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943,

•
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ture of litigation emerges in a variety of contexts: (a) private
suits involving product safety, corporate governance, and other
issues of concern to society;29 (b) suits by or against government or government agencies;30 (c) class actions and other representative actions, which, by definition, involve the specific
substantive rights of large groups of people;31 and (d) "private
attorney general" suits ''to prevent [a government] official from
acting in violation of his statutory powers."32
There may be legitimate reasons, e.g., trade secrets or
highly personal information, to restrict access to the information gathered in litigation. In these instances, parties may
seek a protective order to keep the results confidential. This is
expressly permitted by Rule 26, but the moving party must
show good cause as to why an order should be granted.33 Parties often agree to such protective orders, and, as a result, a ju-

944 (7th Cir. 1999).
29.
See products and events described supra notes 2-4 and accompanying
text.
30.
See, e.g., Mullins v. City of Griffin, 886 F. Supp. 21, 22-23 (N.D. Ga. 1995)
(holding municipality not entitled to a protective order of confidentiality of settlement in civil rights lawsuit filed against it).
31.
The public nature of these actions is represented by Rule 23(d)(2), which
provides that a court may require that the class receive notice and an opportunity
to intervene in various aspects of the litigation, and Rule 23(e), which requires
class members to be notified of proposed dismissal or compromise. FED. R. CIV. P.
23(d)(2); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
32.
Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.
1943), cert. granted, 319 U.S. 739 (1943), order vacated, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
These cases typically involve a statutory cause of action granted to individuals
injured by conduct Congress wishes to proscribe, often combined with statutory
attorney fees for the prev~iling plaintiff. In this content, the public nature of s~ch
a suit exists even when a plaintiff seeks compensatory damages rather than simply injunctive relief. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters, 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968)
(per curiam). "Unlike most private tort litigants, a civil rights plaintiff seeks to
vindicate important civil and constitutional rights that cannot be valued solely in
monetary terms." City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574 (1986).
33.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). Rule 26(c) identifies eight kinds of protective orders
that a district court might issue, but the list is nonexclusive and courts have wide
discretion to order other appropriate discovery restriction. Such an order is appropriate where ''justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." See CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 2036 (2d ed, 1997) (quoting FED. R.
CIV. P. 26(c)); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984) (noting that
"trial court is in the best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and interests of parties affected by discovery''). See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2684 (1995) (addressing privacy issues
in settlement of cases).
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dicial examination of whether good cause actually exists never
takes place. Despite initial agreement, one of the parties may
seek relief from, or third parties may intervene to challenge,
such private agreements.34 Absent a protective order, a plaintiff or defendant has the right to disseminate information obtained during discovery so long as the purpose for sharing is
lawful.35 Moreover, if the discovery is filed in court, as Rule 5
required for many years, the information is publicly available.
Although parties, particularly plaintiffs, may be willing to
trade access to pre·trial information for litigation or monetary
concessions by defendants, this does not answer the fundamental question. When there is a demonstrable public interest in
the information in question, a party may have no right to sell
nondisclosure.36 It is the federal court discovery rules,34.

See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139 (2d Cir.
1987); San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. District Court, 187 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir.
1999).
35. Exum v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 209 F.R.D. 201, 205 (D. Colo. 2002) (''Parties to litigation have a First Amendment right to disseminate information they
obtained in discovery absent a valid protective order."); Federal Trade Comm'n v.
Digital Interactive Assocs., Inc., 1996 WL 912156 (D. Colo. 1996) (emphasizing
that in ruling on motion for a protective order, court "begins with the premise that
a party to litigation has a Constitutionally protected right to disclose the fruits of
discovery to non parties absent a valid protective order entered by a court");
Oklahoma Hosp. Ass'n v. Oklahoma Publ'g. Co., 7 48 F.2d 1421, 1424 (lOth Cir.
1984) (noting constitutionally protected right to disseminate information obtained
through discovery); Harris v. Amoco Prod. Co., 768 F.2d 669, 683-84 (5th Cir.
1985) ("A party may generally do what it wants with material obtained through
the discovery process, as long as it wants to do something legal.").
36. See generally Susan P. Koniak, Are Agreements to Keep Secret Information
Learned in Discovery Legal, Illegal or Something in Between?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV.
783 (2002) (analyzing arguments against contracting for secrecy in federal litigation). Even confidentiality duties imposed on professionals are abrogated under
certain circumstances. For example, communications between attorneys and
their clients are protected, but societal interests may override these duties where
public health or safety is involved. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. L&R § 4503, 4505
(McKinney 1992). A "compelling interest in public health" takes precedence, for
example, over the attorney-client privilege claimed by the defendant in written
communications between counsel and firm executives. Sackman v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 920 F. Supp. 357, 365 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated, 167 F.R.D. 6 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
(reversed to permit interveners to be heard on discoverability of the documents in
question). See also Leonen v. Johns-Manville, 135 F.R.D. 94, 100 (D.N.J. 1990).
Indeed, lawyers are not alone in this duty to sometimes disclose information that
may have come into their possession. Physician-patient privileges and employeremployee confidentiality contracts are analogous. See, e.g., Brillantes v. Superior
Court of L.A. County, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 770 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding state's
..
interest in fraud investigation outweighed doctor privilege); People v. Bhatt, 611
N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (recognizing exception to privilege in context of
Medicare fraud investigations); McCormick on Evidence, at 225.
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including protective orders which govern the obligation to
produce information. Even in the case of trade secrets, "a privilege to disclose may ... be given by the law, independently of
the [owner's] consent, in order to promote some public interest."37 Once discovery is filed in court, it should be available
unless sealed by a neutral judge. Unfortunately, stipulated protective orders are often approved pro-forma by overburdened
courts anxious to avoid time consuming inquiries into discovery
disputes.
Opponents of public access to discovery information often
claim that this potential availability will make court proceedings dramatically slower and more expensive.38 Defendants, in
particular, may arguably resist more forcibly discovery requests, diverting court time to collateral matters. This argument is overstated. First, contemporary discovery is already
often a brass knuckled affair. Each request for information is
typically treated as narrowly as possible, every claim of privilege or irrelevance is asserted as broadly as possible. 39
The general principle guiding discovery requests for documents is that defense counsel may not flatly lie or hide
documents, but they are entitled to be "aggressive," make
the plaintiffs lawyer "work for what he wants," and withhold from relieving the plaintiffs' lawyers of the burden of
preparing his own case.40

Second, even more important, open discovery files in appropriate circumstances are consistent with the modern trend to have

37.

RESTATEMENT OF'TORTS § 757 cmt. d (1939). See Lachman v. Sperry-Son
Well Surveying Co., 457 F.2d 850, 854 (lOth Cir. 1972) (while nondisclosure
agreement in contract proper, public policy prevented enforcement). The Restatement (Second) of Agency likewise recognizes that the duty of loyalty, owed by
an agent to a principal, includes a privilege to reveal confidential information necessary to protect "a superior interest of himself or of a third person."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 395 cmt. f (1957).
38. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 25, at 484 ("public access would disrupt orderly trial preparation by fomenting opposition to broad discovery'').
39. Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary Observations, 67 FORDHAM. L. REV. 709, 712 (1998).
40.
ld. See also Michael E. Wolfson, Addressing the Adversarial Dilemma of
Civil Discovery, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 17, 18-19 (1988) (opining that discovery
"gives impetus and opportunity to the baser litigational instincts of delay, deception, and unbridled confrontational advocacy''). "Where the object always is to
beat every plowshare into a sword, the discovery procedure is employed variously
as weaponry." MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 18 (1980).
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judges manage caseloads to prevent delay and reduce costs.41
As case man,a gers, judges need information provided by filed
discovery, and statutory reform has magnified this function. 42
The Manual for Complex Litigation recommends sharing
discovery materia1,43 which promotes efficiency and fairness. 44
Information sharing avoids duplication of effort and allows refinement in the language of discovery requests, achieving
greater accuracy and specificity.- Similarly situated claimants
and defendants may pool documents, including deposition -a nd
trial transcripts, share research and availability of experts, and
create other economic efficiencies. Defendants routinely engage in joint efforts, 4 5 and there are now well-publicized examples of plaintiffs using similar tactics. 46 The significance of
third-party access to pretrial materials may also be inferred
from the very aggressive efforts by d,e fendants to block dissemination of discovery information.47 Third parties often accept the confidentiality conditions agreed to by the original litigants in order to re-ceive information needed for their own
cases. Such a coerced choice should not be permitted.
Finally, secrecy proponents often note that local federal
district courts had promulgated rules barring or excusing par-

See FED. R. -CIV. P. 16{b) (requiring judges to set time limits for certain
events in all cases except those exempted by local rule).
42.
See S. REP. No. 101-416, at 16 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6803, 6819. The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee, from which the CJRA
emanated, explains that the Act was to increase the ''benefits of enhanced case
management" because "greater and earlier judicial control over civil cases yields
faster rates of disposition._" Id. See also JAMES S. K.AKALIK ET AL., AN
41.

EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM

ACT 3 (1996) (evaluating statutorily mandated case expense and delay plans).
43.
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) § 21.432 (noting that "sub-

stantial savings in time and expense may often been achieved").
44.
FED. R,. CIV. P. 1 ("just,- speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action" are the objectives of the federal rules-of civil procedure). See also United
Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co.~ 905 F.2d 14-24, 1427-28 (lOth Cir. 1990) (allowing access to discovery in the interest of '"saving time- and effort in the collateral case").
45.
Erichson, supra note 10, at 401-08 (outlining defense attorneys' coordina·
tion of strategy and sharing of information in a wide variety of cases and contexts).
46.
ld. at 386--96.
47.
See, e.g., Stuart E. Rickerson, Corporate Counsel's Guide to the New Rules,
61 DEF. COUNS. J. 192, 196 (1994) (maintaining that pursuit of protective orders
is advisable for defendants); Daniel Boyd Smith, Anti·Dissemination Orders in
Product Liability Suits, 5 AM-. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 507, 512 (1982) (describing defendant's attempts to curtail dissemination of information) .
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ties from filing discovery materials unless ordered to do so,
even while Rule 5(d) required filing. While there were many of
4
these local rules, 8 their validity was suspect. Since its promulgation in 1938, Rule 83 forbade district court initiatives inconsistent with the national rules.49 Despite this, local rules
often deviated from the federal rules in many particulars. During the 1980s, the Judicial Conference inaugurated a Local
Rules Project to compile information about this phenomenon.50
The report questioned the authority of district courts to order
that discovery material not be filed and concluded such rules or
orders are only permitted when strong public or private interests compel waiving the filing requirement. 51
The issue of whether discovery was to be filed in court was
openly and vigorously debated during the consideration of a
proposed amendment to Rule 5(d) in 1978 and explicitly rejected by the final changes implemented in 1980.52 The 1980
amendment did provide courts the opportunity to dispense with
filing in an individual case, rather than on a general basis. 53

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISCOVERY IN FEDERAL COURTS
Access by parties in a lawsuit to information held by others modern discovery has not always been available. The
English common law system was characterized by rigid, writdominated pleadings, restricted parties, and limited issues.
48.
See Marcus, supra note 25, at 466, n.56 {listing local rules permitting par~
ties not to file some or all discovery rnaterials in court unless so ordered by the
court or if materials are needed in connection with motion proceeding).
49. Original Rule 83 provided that "[e]ach district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from time to time make and amend rules governing
its practice not inconsistent with these rules." WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 33, at §
3151 n.1 (emphasis added) (quoting original Rule 83).
50. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., Report of the Local Rules Project (1988) [hereinafter "Local Rules
Project Report"] (finding approximately 5,000 local rules and concluding many
conflicted with the national rules). See, e.g., A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1572 (1991)
(finding "rampant inconsistency between local and national rules"). In addition,
Congress, in 1988, revised the statutory provisions on local rule and required each
federal appellate court, through its judicial counsel, to examine and regulate local
rules of districts courts within its circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(c) (1988).
51.
See Local Rules Project Report, supra note 50, at 1-7. The Local Rules
Project urged the Advisory Committee to consider amending the federal rule. Id.
at 92.
52.
See infra Part IV. C.
53.
FED. R. Crv. P. 5(d).

DISCOVERING DISCOVERY

829

These restrictions undergirded a court proce_s s structurally antithetical to information gathering tools. In "legal'' cases, parties had to identify the specific materials they sought in discovery.54 Even under Field Codes in American states, a plaintiff
could not begin discovery unless he or she could independently
substantiate facts stated in a complaint. 55 There was little opportunity· to examine documents that might be relevant and
useful, or to use depositions:, interrogatories, or other information gathering tools56 to facilitate the proof of an existing or
new theory of the case.57 In 1911, the U.S. Supreme Court denounced as a ''fishing bill" any effort by a party to "pry into the
case of his adversary to learn its strength or weakness."58 On
the other hand, the practice·s in equity courts provided the basis for modern discovery devices. 59
The adoption of the FRCP in 1938 marked a new approach
and epoch. Charles Clark, former President of the Association
of American Law Schools and the drafter of the Federal Rules
was fond of quoting Frankfurter: ''[n]ew winds are blowing on
old doctrines, the critical spirit infiltrates traditional formulas .. .. ."60 The Federal Rules simplified pleading,61 liberalized
joinder of parties and claims,62 and emphasized ease of litiga54.

See 6 JAMES WM-. MOORE, ET AL., MOORE'S 'F EDERAL PRACTICE § 26 (3d ed.
2001) (describing discovery procedures at common law).
55.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2241 (1989). "Under the codes, a plaintiff could not even get into discovery unless she could inde·
pendently substantiate such suspicions, for substantiation had to be manifested in
a complaint that stated 'facts."' Id. In his 1928 work on code pleadings, Professor
Clark described twenty·eight states as having adopted the Field Code; none of the
remaining jurisdictions still adhered completely to common law pleading.
CHARLES

E.

CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 19-20 (1928).
generally GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL (1932)

See
(describing discovery devices and procedures used in various American jurisdictions in 1932).
57.
See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1155 (N.D. IlL
1979) ("[T]he heart of any American antitrust case is the discovery of business
documents. Without them, there is virtually no case.").
Carpenter v. Winn; 221 U.S. 533, 540 (1911).
58.
59.
See generally Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed.~ The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691
(1998).
60.
Charles Clark, What Now?, Address of the President of the Association of
American Law Schools at the arst Annual Meeting (December 28.. 30, 1933), in 20
A.B.A J. 431, 432 (1934) (quoting Felix Frankfurter, The Early Writings of 0. W.
Holmes, Jr., 44 HARV. L. REV. 717 (1931)).
61.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
62.
FED. R. CIV. P. 13, 14, 18-24; Stephen N. Subrin~ How Equity Conquered
56.

•
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tion rather than technical legal pleading. These changes in the
pretrial process were mutually reinforcing. Gene.r ally, notice
pleading ha.d to be supplemented by open discovery. Another
major theoretical and practical feature of the 1938 procedural
revolution was elimination of varied pleading requirements for
different types of cases. Professor Clark insisted that principles of uniformity and simplicity· and the merger of law and equity required the same rules for all cases. 63
Most scholars give the credit for the innovative discovery
concepts embodied in the FRCP to Professor Edson R. Sunderland.64 Sunderland was a scholar engaged in the real world.
He. had consistently advocated expanding discovery te.c hniques.65 Professor Subrin notes that the initial draft of the
Federal Rules distributed for public comment "included every
type of discovery that was known in the United States and
probably England up to that time."66 Responding to. this new
spirit, the Supreme Court wrote in 1946:
No longer can the time~honored cry of 'fishing expedition'
serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the
relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper
litigation. 67
.·

The original Federal Rules, however, still had significant
limits upon discovery.. Production and examination of docu-

Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135
U. PA. L. REV. 909, 982-91 (1987).
63.
See ADVISORY COMM. TRANSCRIPT (Nov. 14, 1935), noted in Subrin, supra
note 62, at 977.
64.
See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 59, at 734, 736.
65.
See, e.g., Edson R. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before
Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863 (1933).
66.
Subrin, supra note 59, at 718.
If one adds up all of the types of discovery permitted in individual state
courts, one finds some precursors to what later became discovery under
the Federal Rules; but ~ .. no one state allowed the total panoply of devices. Moreover, the Federal Rules, as they became law in 1938, elimi·
nated features of discovery that in some states had curtailed the scope of
discovery and the breadth of its use.
Id. at 719.
67.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947); see also United States v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682-83 (1958) (discovery together with the
fair trial procedures make trial less a game of blind man's bluff and more a fair
contest).
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ments, for example, were available only if ordered by the judge
upon showing of "good cause."68 Over time, restraints on access
to docum-e nts were gradually limited,69 and other changes con·
tinued to expand discovery. ln 1946, the Federal Rules were
amended to make -c lear that even inadmissible material was
discoverable so long as it was "reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence."70 In 1948, the requirement of leave of court for taking depositions was eliminated71
as were limits on the number or scope of interrogatories.7 2 At
the same. time, the standard for do~ument production and inspection was eased from documents "material to the case'' to
documents "related to the case . "73 In 1970, insurance policies
were explicitly made discoverable, 74 and enforcement of the·
motion to compel was expanded to apply to all discovery devices except mental and physical exams under Rule 35.75
Liberalized discovery was consistent with the general
trends in federal civil procedure. An opportunity to engage in
meaningful pretrial information-gathering is the counterpart to
notice pleading76 and an essential elem,e nt in a just dispute

68.

AM. BAR ASS'N,, RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURT OF

THE UNITED STATES WITH NOTES AS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES

74 (William W. Dawson ed., 1938). "Upon motion of any party showing good cause
therefor and upon notice to all other parties, the court . ~ . may ... order any party
to produce ... documents ~ .. which constitute or contain evidence material to any
matter involved in the action ...." Id. (emphasis added). "Inspections [of documents] had always been strictly regulated by the court and the potential free invasion of files had always been feared." WILLIAM GLASER, PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY
AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 33 (1968).
69.
In 1970, the requirement for prior judicial approval for docume.nt discovery was removed entirely in the~ federal courts. See Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 527 (1970).
70.
This language is now found at the end of FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(l).
71.
See Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, Report of Proposed
Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United
States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 453 (1946).
See id. at 461.
72.
73.
ld. at 463.
74.
See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating
to Discovery~ 48 F.R.D. 487, 487 (1970).
75.
See id. at 538.
76.
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507-08 (holding discovery process provides information for trial and pleadings merely give notice). The term ''notice pleading" may
well be inaccurate because in actual court practice complaints (and counterclaims)
must give "fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests." 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 1202 (3d. ed. 2004) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 335 U.S. 41, 58
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resolution system.77 Improved discovery creates better access
to courts and facilitates greater social justice. Cases are no
longer decided on "sporting" rules that allow s11tprise evidence
and hidden traps for the unwary or· misled.78 The long struggle
to establish the liability of the tobacco companies for damages
caused to smokers, their public and private insurers, and the
public would have been inconceivable without access to information possessed mainly by the industry. The production of
documents and/or electronically stored information is typically
a plaintiffs best means of obtaining evidence to prove a case
that would not be otherwise demonstrable or to transform
merely compensatory damages into a punitive award. Equityderived access to information allows equity-derived remedies,
developed for this purpose in institutional reform cases.79
Since 1970, t<
h e tide has changed. The thrust of the
amendments to the federal rules since then has been toward
containing the cost and time expended on the exchange of pretrial information. In 1983, a clause in Rule 26(a), which previously provided that the frequent use of discovery mechanisms
was not to be limited was deleted and a sentence was added to
Rule 26(b) permitting courts to limit discovery. New Rule 26(g)
encouraged judges to impose appropriate sanctions for discovery abuse80 and explicitly b,a rred disproportionate discovery.81
In 1993, new automatic disclosure provisions were introduced,
and explicit limits on depositions and interrogatories were codified. 82 Amendments to the federal rules expanded the role of

(1957)).
77.
See, e.g., FED. ·n. CIV. P. 8(a); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957)
(noting pretrial information gathering and issue defining are critical to the structure of modern litigation and these rest upon appropriate discovery methods).
78.
See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 62, at 945.
79.
See Abraham Chayes,. The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1292-96 (1976); Owen Fiss, The Social and Political Founda ..
tions of Adjudication, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1982) (describing ''structural
reform" litigation and judges, particularly federal judges, who use historic equity
powers to expand rights).
80~
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (advisory committee notes to the 1983 amendments); Richard L. Marcus, Reducing Cost & Delay: the Potential Impact of the
1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 JUDICATURE 363
(1983).
81.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).
82.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d), 26(£). Rule 30 was revised to require leave of·
court if more than ten depositions were, desired. Amended Rule aa limited the
number of interrogatories to thirty. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 40 (1993).
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jud-g es early in litigation by requirin-g the approval of discovery
plans.83 The 2000 amendments went even further to restrict
the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)(1).84
The issue of access to pretrial information centers on Rule.
5. Analysis of the debates over the text of Rule 5 between 1938
and the present and federal court analysis of third party access
to discovery materials shed considerable light on the strength
of claims for openness. I turn next to those tasks.

Ill. HISTORY OF RULE 5 AND FILING OF DISCOVERY
A. The Initial Rule
In the beginning, Congress created the Rules Enabling Act,
authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of practice
and procedure for the federal courts.85 Soon afterward, a committee of practitioners and academics produced a draft set of
rules.. Among its innovative features was the orientation toward the procedural rules used in equity .r ather than in common law; this orientation included new means of obtainin-g information before trial.
In 1936, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules submitted
three drafts- of a rule designated Rule 6, which addressed service and filing, with commentary on each draft.86 The following
year, the Advisory Committee proposal appeared as Rule 5.87
Rule 5. Service and Filing of Pleadings and Other Papers
(a) Service: When Required. Every order required by its
terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to the original
complaint unless the court otherwise orders because. of numerous defendants, every written motion other than one
which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice; appearance, demand, offer of judgment, designation of record
on appeal, and similar paper shall be served upon each of
the parties affected thereby.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(l)(A), (B).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(l) (information without leave of court now only
available when "relevant to a claim or defense'-' of party in place of the prior
broader "relevant to the subject matter" of the dispute).
85.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2005).
86.
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 76, § 1142.
87.
Id.atn.l~
83.
84..

'

.

......... __,TI'Y OF CO.LORADO IAW REVIEW

834
• •

[Vol. 78

•

(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be
served upon a party shall be filed with the court either before service or within a reasonable time thereafter.

(e) Filing With the Court Defined. The filing of pleadings
and other p·a pers with the court as required by these rules
shall be made by filing them with the clerk of the
co·u rt
·. . .... 88

The term "similar paper" in Rule 5(a) was intended to avoid a
restrictive list of litigation papers required to be serve-d ·a nd
hence filed in court, and this term was judicially construed to
extend to a large variety of documents not specifically mentioned.89 Since its a.d option in 1938, Rule 5 has governed service of all papers and pleadings subsequent to service of the
summons and complaint (covered by Rule 4). As such, Rule 5
focuses on the interchange of information between parties to a
lawsuit and the orderly filing of those papers in court where
access to the information may ·b e obtained.90
The original federal discovery rules contained variations
that could result in different filing requirements. Rule 30
(Depositions),91 Rule 33 (lnterrogatories),92 and Rule. 36 (Request for Admission)93 all explicitly required service on parties
and filing in court, while Rule 34 (Document Inspections and

88.
FED. R. CIV. P. 5(a), (d)-(e) (1938) (emphasis added).
89.
See, e.g., In re Aucoin. 150 B.R. 644 (D. LA) (1993) (similar paper applied
to Bankruptcy filings); In re Sasson Jeans, Inc. 86 B.R. 336 (D.N.Y. 1988) (bank~
ruptcy filings); Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. VTR, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1309 (1975)
(contempt proceedings). Rule 5 also required the service of papers on all parties
'" affected there:by." This language later produced disputes regarding which parties
were entitled to notice of proceedings taking place during the lawsuit and various
documents. This problem was eliminated in 1963 by the deletion of the words "at·
fected thereby'' in order to promote a "full exchange of information among the parties." WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 76, § 1142.
90~
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 76, § 1411, n.4.
91.
FED. R. CIV. P. 30{a) (1938).
92.
FED. R. CIV. P. 33 (1938) ("Any party may serve Upon any adverse party
written interrogatories to be answered by the party served, or if the party served
is a public or private corporation or a pa,rtnership or association, by any officer
thereof ,c ompetent to testify in its behalf.'~)
93.
FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a) (1938) ("At any time after the pleadings are closed, a
party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the
latter of the genuineness of any relevant documents described in and exhibited
with the request or of the truth of any relevant matters of fact set forth therein.")
'

'
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Entry upon Land) did not.94 It seems fair to conclude, however,
that from their inception, the service/filing and dis-c overy rules
mandated th.a t information gathered during the pretrial period
be filed in court absent affirmative action by a court. Once
filed in court, this information was presumptively open to examination by anyone unless a Rule 26 protective order was obtained. Discussion of the case law under Rule 5 until 1970,
when it was amended, is in Section V.A.
Because of the multiplicity of bodies dealing with changes
to the FRCP, a brief road map of the amendment process may
be helpful. In accordance with the Rules Enabling Act of
1934,95 amendments to federal rules go through a hierarchical
path in the U.n ited States Judicial Conference. Amendments
are drafted by the relevant advisory committee, later considered by the Standing Committee on Rules and Practice, and
then submitted to the Judicial Conference.96 If the Judicial
Conference approves, the amendments are considered by the
United States Supreme Court.97 The Court may reject or modify proposed revisions and promulgates them prior to May
lst.98 The High Court then submits the amendment to Congress, which has until December 1st to modify or reject the
proposed change.99 If Congress fails to act, the amendment is
final.

FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (1938).
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon notice
to all other parties, the court in which an action is pending may (1) orderany party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on beh-a lf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books . . or (2) order any party to permit entry upon des·
ignated land or other property in his possession or control for the
purpose of inspecting, measuring ....
95. Presently codified at 28 U.S.C~ §§ 2072-74 (2003).
96.
The advisory committee is_appointed by the Chief Justice of the United
States. See U.S. Courts website, http://www. uscourts.govlreview .htm (last visited
-.M ay 19, 2006) (he:r einafter "U.S. Courts website"). The Standing Committee is
appointed in the same way as the advisory committee, i.e., in the sole discretion of
the Chief Justice. 28 U.S.C. § 2073. The Judicial Conference is composed of the
Chief Justice, the Chief Judges of the U ~S. Courts of Appeals, and a district judge
from each circuit. See id.
97.
See U.S. Courts w_ebsite~ supra note 95.
98.
ld.
99.
Id.
94.
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B. The 1970 Amendment to Rule 5(a)
The 1970 revision of Rule 5 began with a proposal in 1967
by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. Although there was
an initial discussion of an amendment to Rule 5 at the Advisory
Committee meeting, the members decided not to vote on a proposal without public comment.lOO In November 1967, the Advi:
sory Committee published a Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments.IOI The proposed addition to Rule 5 is in bold:
Rule 5. Service and Filing of Pleadings and Other Papers.
(a) Service: When required. Except as otherwise provided in
these rtd~J', every order required by its terms to be served,
every pleading subsequent to the original complaint unless
the court otherwise orders because of the numerous defendants, eve:ry paper ·r elating to discovery required to
be served upon a party unless the cqurt otherwise
orders, every written motion other than one which may be
heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, designation of record on appeal,
and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties.
• • •

(d) .Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be
served upon a party shall be filed with the court either before service or within a reasonable time thereafter.
.

.

100.
MINUTES OF THE MARCH 1967 MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMMITIEE ON
CML RULES 4Q-41 (1967). Unfortunately, the minutes do not provide the actual

change that the committee discussed. Id. -J udge Thomsen~ a committee member,
argued that it was "a mistake to change Rules just offhand because some think it's
a good idea, without the reporter having looked for the snakes .... I don't think
we ought to publish changes of Rules which are just brought at a .m eeting here,
when nobody has had a change to think about them." Id. Another committee
member stated that he would vote against a change to the Rule, and the committee ended up not making any changes to Rule 5 at that time. I d.
101.
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedures

•

for the United States District Courts Relating to Deposition and Discovery, 43
F.R.D. 211 (1967). The Preliminary Draft was published by both the Standing
Committee and the Advisory Committee. !d. at 213. The draft noted that the
proposed amendments were a result of consideration by the Advisory Committee .
Id. The proposals were. also a result of a field study of the operation of the existing discovery rules conducted by the Columbia University Project for Effective
Justice. !d. at 217. The advisory committee noted that all parties must be served
with all papers relating to discovery to inform all parties of the progress of litiga •
tion. Id.
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(e) Filing With the Court Defined. The filing of pleadings
and other papers with the court as required by these rules
shall be made ·by filing them with the clerk of the
court .... 102

The proposal made explicit what had been implicit, i.e.,, that all
discovery was to be served on each party and, pursuant to Rule
5(d), filed with the. court. The Standing Committee met from
:J uly 17~19, 1969, to discuss the change to Rule 5(a) and ratified the propo'sa1. 103
The Supreme Court approved the
amendment and submitted it to Congress . I04 Because Con..
gress took no action, 105 Rule 5 now explicitly required court filing of all discovery material.
Rule 5(a) and the discovery rules were changed to require
that service of all discovery papers be made on all parties regardless of which party produced the information, unless the
district court ordered otherwise., 106 Exceptions could be made
by the district ,court if discovery was voluminous or there were
many parties.I07 A court's power to excuse filing was codified
in the 1980 amendments to Rule 5(d))08 With regard to acce.ss
to discovery, the Advisory Committee note to the 1970 amendment recognized that problems might be created for district
courts when discovery papers become voluminous.l09

102.

REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL CONCERNING PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RELATING TO
DEPOSITION AN DISCOVERY (Nov. 1, 1968). ''We propose no change in this Rule as

drafted by the Advisory Committee." I d. at 2, 4.
103.
MINUTES OF THE JULY 17-19; 1969 MEETING OF THE STANDING
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2 (1969). The Committee
noted that there were comments from lawyers complaining that certain parties in
multi .. party disputes would be excluded from some discovery exchanges. The October,. 1969 Report by the· Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
was published in 48 F.R.D. 487 (1970). Report of the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure to the Judicial Conference, Oct., 1969.
104.
48 F.R.D. 487, 491 (1970). Justices Black and Douglas dissented from the
amendments and from the Court's action in sending them to Congress. ld. at 459.
There was no. explanation of why these Justices dissented. See id.
105.
48 F.R.D. 459, 491-92 (1970).
106.
The explicit purpos.e of this amendment was to respond to complaints that
parties in a multiple party suit did not receive certain discovery materials because
the materials did not pertain directly to them. FED. R. Crv. R. 5(a) advisory committee's note (1970).
107.
48 F.R.D. 487 at 492.
108.
See infra Part N.C; see also 85 F.R.D. 521 (1980).
109-.
Id.
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Moreover, taken as a whole, it was clear the FRCP required discovery to be filed. The introductory language of Rule
5(a), "except as otherwise provided in these rules," recognized
that other parts of the FRCP may provide for different service
provisions. Several other rules, e.g., Rule 45(c) subpoenas and
Rule 77(d) entry of orders in judgments, did indeed specify service in a different fashion. Section V.B. will discuss the case
law relating to access to discovery between 1970 and 1980.

C. The 1980 Amendment to Rule 5(d)
1.

The Initial1978 Proposal

As we have seen, filing of all discovery was historically required by the FRCP and explicitly required by the 1970
Amendment to Rule 5. In June of 1977, the Federal Judicial
Center published a Survey of Local Civil Discovery Procedures,
highlighting perceived problems regarding discovery.IIO Later
that year, a report by the Special Committee for the Study of
Discovery Abuse of the ABA's Litigation Section supported a
FRCP amendment that would eliminate the required filing of
depositions because of cost and storage concerns. til The Committee specifically did not support non-filing of other discovery
material interrogatories, requests for admissions, and requests for production. liZ "Generally, the cost of filing copies of,
and requisite storage for, these types of papers should not be
burdensome."ll3 In fact, the Committee noted that it is beneficial for courts to have these documents in order to prepare for
pretrial conferences and for other purposes.114

The survey focused on consumption of judicial resources, attorneys' lack of
diligence in expediting litigation and the "abuse" of the pre-trial process. Thad M.
Guyer, Survey of Local Civil Discovery Procedures (Federal Judicial Center 1977).
Ill.
Report of the American Bar Association Special Committee for the Study of
Discovery Abuse, Section of Litigation (1977) A.B.A. LIT. REP. microformed on CI7701-35 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference). "The committee recognizes
that the cost of providing additional copies of transcripts of oral depositions can be
considerable and that storage problems may exist with respect thereto. This
committee therefore, endorses the amendment to the extent that it would dispense with the necessity of filing depositions upon oral examination.'' I d.
112.
Id. "The committee believes, however, that interrogatories, requests for
admissions, answers to each, and requests for production should continue to be
filed with the court." ld.
113.. ld.
114.
Id. "Additionally, the court would be assisted by having these discovery
110.
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The ruletnaking process applicable to the 1980 amendments to the civil rules required the Advisory Committee to circulate drafts of proposed amendments to bench and bar and to
schedule and conduct public hearings if appropriate. In March
of 1978, a proposed change to Rule 5{d) was published in the
Federal Rules Decision) IS Additions to the existing Rule 5 are
bolded:
(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be
served upon a party shall be filed with the court either before service or within a reasonable time thereafter[.], but,
unless filing is ordered by the court on motion of a
party or upon its own motion, depositions upon oral
examination and interrogatories and requests for
admission and the answers thereto need rtot be filed
unless and until they are used in the proceedings.l16

The proposal would have fundamentally altered practice under
Rule 5 by forbidding filing-of discovery materials except those
ordered to be filed by the district court or "used in the proceeding."ll7 The Judicial Conference Civil Rules Committee circulated the proposal, together with other suggested, far more controversial discovery amendments, for public comment, 118 and
there were many responses.ll9
The amendment reflected the views of a number of district
court judges and court clerks regarding the burden presented
papers accessible to it so that the court _c ould more fully prepare for pretrial con·
ferences and other hearings relating to the action." ld.
115.
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Pro~
cedure, 77 F.R.D. 613, 622 (1978).
116. ld.
117.
ld.
118.
WINIFRED R. BROWN,
FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND
POSSIBILITIES 17 (Federal Judicial Center 1981).
119.
Id. at 18, n.40.
Comments were received from various bar associations, practicing lawyers, the Department of Justice, clerks of court, the National Shorthand
Reporters Association, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
the Ge.neral Counsel of the NAACP Special Contribution ·F und, the Institute for Public Representation (Georgetown University Law -C enter), the
American Civil Liberties Union, various associations of newspaper pub·
lishers and editors, Legal Aid and Services Associations, the Migrant Legal Action Program, and the Public Citizen Litigation Group.
Jd. at 18. There was originally only a ninety day public comment period. Due to
requests fo:r; extension, the final date for comment was November 30 rather than
July 1 of 1978.
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by the requirement to file all discovery and to serve it on all
counseJ.l20 Some district courts had adopted local rules limiting the filing of interrogatories and other discovery devices.I21
The proposal generated sharp debate and controversy from
members of the legal community and the press. Public hear·
ings were held for two days in Washington and Los Angeles in
October and November 1978, where twenty-five representatives expressed their views.122 There is no public record of
these oral comments.I23 However, there is a record of the written comments. The Standing Committee received nineteen
written responses, nine in favor and ten in opposition to the
proposed amendments.124

120.
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 76, at 1152, n.3.
121.
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 76, at 1152, n.4.
122.
Letter from Walter Mansfield, Chairman of the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules to Judge Thomsen, Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure (June 14, 1979), microformed on CI-8201 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference).
123.
The Federal Judicial Center report did not contain specific sources regarding the hearings. Brown, supra note 118, at 19-20, n.42. However, this report did
note the witnesses present at each hearing:
Witnesses at the Washington hearings were: representatives of the
American Bar Association; the National Shorthand Reporters Association; the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund; the National Council of the United States Magistrates; a New York admiralty law firm; the bar associations of the cities of New York and of
Philadelphia; Special Counsel to the National Commission for Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures; two clerks of court; a patent
attorney; and a private practitioner specializing in complex litigation. Witnesses in Los Angeles were: representatives of the American Bar Association and of the Los Angeles County Bar Association;
the chairman of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference Ad Hoc
Committee on Discovery; two private practitioners; and the two di-·
rectors of an Arizona State University study of discovery.
I d. Also, microfiche materials from the Notre Dame library did not contain a pub·
lie record of the· hearings. All information pertaining to the public hearings was
taken from the Federal Judicial Center Report. All microfiche materials were obtained form the Notre Dame Library using the indexes provided by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
124.
Many of the letters simply agreed with the proposed changes. See, e.g.,
Letters from Eugene Gordon and Carmon Stuart to Judge Thompsen, Chairman
of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Oct. 6, 1978), microformed on CI- 7606 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference); Letter from the
American College of Trial Lawyers (Aug. 16, 1978), microformed on CI-7607 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference); Committee on Federal Courts of the New
York State Bar Association report to Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr., Secretary of the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Nov. 29, 1978), microformed on
CI-7603 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference). Others agreed with the proposed changes and recommended additional changes of their own. See, e.g., Letter
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A number of the negative comments were quite detailed.
The American Newspaper Publishers Association, for example,
emphasized the public's right of access to information concerning the government and the judicial system. The Publisher's
Association opposed the proposed change to Rule 5(d) because
members of the press who cover court proceedings regularly
check discovery materials for information.l25 This submission
quoted the Supreme Court in Cox Broadcasting Co. v~ Cohn, l26
describing the public's reliance on the press to provide vital information, and concluded the "[First] Amendment rests on the
assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the
welfare of the public, that a free press is a condition of a free
society.'' l27

from Robert Jenkins, Professor at Campbell College School of Law (Nov. 10,
1978), microformed on CI-7603 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference) (agreeing with the proposal and suggesting adding that Rule 34 materials should also
not be filed); Comments by the Discovery Abuse Committee of the_National Conference of Special Court Judges (June 10, 1978), microformed on CI-7513-94 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference) (supporting the drafted change to Rule 5,
but asking that responses to requests for admissions be exempted from the nonfiling proposal); Letter from the Community Legal Aid Society to the Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure (June 19, 1978), microformed on CI-7607 (Re·
cord of the U.S. Judjcial Conference) (making minor suggestion to the proposal
about whether a court has discretion to deny a party's motion).
The letters in opposition to the proposed changes cited various reasons for
their disapproval. See, e.g., Letter from Allen Barrow, Chief Judge of the Northern District of Oklahoma, to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
(June 15, 1978), microformed on Cl-7607 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference) (arguing that the proposed amendment would cause increased paperwork
due to requests for requiring filing; arguing that the amendment would also delay
the trial process); Letter from Ann Broadwell of the Legal Aid Society of San
Mateo County, California, to Roszel C. Thomsen, Chairperson of the Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 24, 1978), microformed on CI-7609 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference) (stating that the proposed rule makes it difficult for a party to use discovery other than the discovery that party has engaged
in, which makes multi-party litigation difficult); Letter from Walter
Schaefer to
.
the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Aug. 11, 1978), microformed
on CI-7607 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference) (stating that the proposal is
confusing because it was unclear whether filing would be prohibited or simply not
required); Letter from Richard Schmidt; American Society of Newspaper Editors,
to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Nov. 30, 1978), microformed
on CI-7712 (Records of the U.B. Judicial Conference) (opposing the proposal due
to the public use of discovery filings).
125.
Letter from Richard Schmidt, American Society of Newspaper Editors, to
the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Nov. 30, 1978).
126.
420 u.s. 469, 491-92 (1975).
127.
Associated Press v., United States, 326 U.S.l; 20 (1945).
..

842

RSIT'Y OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

The ACLU vigorously opposed the 1978 proposal, stressing
the common law right of public access to judicial records 128 and
the constitutional protection of access to discovery materials. 12 9
Perceived storage problems could not justify an abridgement of
these rights. 130
[I]n our present society[,] many important social issues become entangled to some degree in civil litigation. Indeed
certain civil suits may be instigated for the very purpose of
gaining information for the public. . .. Civil litigation in
general often exposes the need for governmental action or
correction. Such revelations should not be kept from the
public. 131

Finally, the ACLU pointed out that adoption of the proposal
violated public policy. The critical problem with the proposed
change was that it "suggest[ed] that private litigation simply is
none of the general public's business, and that information collected, in anticipation of court proceedings is not 'public' information at all, unless and until it is actually used in those proceedings."l32 The federal rules already provided sufficient
protection for parties' privacy interest through protective orders available upon a showing of good cause. The ACLU thus
argued that the proposed change would shift the burden regarding access to discovery materials from the parties to the
public, contrary to federal statutory provisions which support
the public's access to information.133

Letter from ACLU to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, 2-6 (Dec. 5,
1978), microformed on CI-7601 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference).
129.
ld. at 7-15. See Trial Secrecy and the First Amendment Right of Public
Access to Judicial Proceeding, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1899 (1978).
130. ACLU letter, supra note 128, at 7 (citing cases favoring the public right of
access including Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978); Chicago
Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975)).
131.
ACLU letter, supra note 128 (citing Olympic Refining Co. v. Carter, 332
F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1958)) (stating that taking a deposition ''shall be open to the
public as freely as are trials in open court; and no order excluding the public from
attendance on any such proceedings shall be valid or enforceable."); Alliance to
End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 431 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
132.
ACLU letter, supra note 128. The First Amendment protects the free flow
of information, and the ACLU asserted that discovery materials must be included
in protected information. ld.
133.. Id. (citing Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2004); Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2004); Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(2004)).
.
128.
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The- Revised 1979 Propos-a l

The negative public response to the initial 1978 proposal
persuaded the Advisory Committee to submit a revised draft
amendment in February 1979~ The new proposal follows_. The
material in bold indicates additions to, and the italicized material indicates deletions from, the original 1978 proposed
amendment to Rule 5.
(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be
served upon a party shall be filed with the court either before service or within a reasonable time thereafter[.],but~
unless filing is ordered by the court on motion of a party or
upon its own motion, depositions upon oral examination and
interrogatories and requests· for admission and the answers
thereto need not be filed unless and until they are used in the
proceedings.

but the court may on a motion of a party or on its
own initiative order that depositions upon oral examination and interrogatories, requests for documents, requests for admission, and answers and responses thereto not be filed unless on order of the
court for use in the proceeding.l34

The critical difference, of course, is that the 1978 proposal prohibited filing of discovery absent judicial order, while the 197-9
proposal retained required filing of discovery absent a co-u rt order.
Judge Walter Mansfield, Chair of the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules, credited the change in the proposal to amend
Rule 5(d) to adverse comments following its original publication., He noted three reasons for jettisoning the 1978 changes.
First, the original proposal would create difficulty for multiparty litigants who do not attend all depositions to obtain the
recorded deposition-. Second, the proposal would create an "unconscionable burden" requiring
a
court
order
for
access
to
dis.
covery materials. Third, public interest lawyers had argued
that the initial 1978 proposal would be likely to increase, not to
decrease, costs.I35
-

85 F.R.D. 521; 525 (1980).
135.
Letter from Walter R. Mansfield to Judge Roszel Thomsen, Chairman of
the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (June 14, 1979) (sum134.
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Proponents of the original 1978 proposal then initiated an
org,a nized campaign to reverse this decision~ Carmon J. Stuart,
a clerk in the Middle District of North Carolina, wrote a letter
to other clerks on February 20, 1979, encouraging them to ask
their judges to write in opposition to the 1979 revised draft.I36
Ninetee.n judges, three clerks, and the New York County Lawyers' Association wrote to the Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure in opposition to the 1979 revised draft of the
amendment to Rule 5(d).I37 All but one were submitted within
just three weeks after Mr. Stuart's letter~
mary of reasons for change in the final draft of the amendment).
136.
Letter from Carmon J. Stuart to Clerks of the U.S. District Courts (Feb.
20, 1979), microformed on CI-7805-90 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference)
(explaining the changed proposal and encouraging other clerks to oppose there·
vised draft):
Talk to your chief judge; show him this material if you like; and urge him
to write a letter, supporting this amendment. . . . If your chief judge is
not available, any judge will do. Two judges are better than one. Draft a
letter for him and take it with you when you present this idea to him.
You know better than he does how much the unnecessary filing of this
material costs the courts in terms of space and personnel time {or, if you
are not receiving it~ how much it will cost you if you are ever required to
receive it).
ld. Mr. Stuart included a letter from Judge Gordon of his own court soliciting
other judges to respond. The responses by the chief judges basically followed the
scheme-that Mr. Stuart and Judge Gordon requested. See id.
137.
Letter f:rom Anthony Alaimo, Chief Judge, Southern District of Georgia
(1\'Iar. 5, 1979), microformed on CI-7805-39 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference); Letter from Charles Banta, Clerk, Middle District of Louisiana (Mar. 5,
1979), microformed on CI-7805-51 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference); Letter from James Battin, Chief Judge, District of Montana (Mar. 9, 1979), microforrned on CI-7805-12 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference); Letter from
Howard Bratton, Chief Judge, District of New Mexico (Mar. 12, 1979), microformed on CI-7804-91 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference); Letter from Wal·
ter Craig, Chief Judge, District of Arizona (Mar. 2, 1979), microformed on CI7805-73 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference); Letter from John Curtin, District Judge, Western District of New York (Mar. 7, 1979), microformed on Cl7805 41 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference); Letter from Edward Devitt,
Chief Judge, District of Minnesota (Mar. 23, 1979), microformed on CI-7804-85
(Records of the U.S~ Judicial Conference); Letter fro1n Franklin Dupree, Judge,
Eastern District of North Carolina (Mar. 8, 1979), microformed on CI-7805-28
(Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference); Letter from Clarkson Fisher, Judge,
District of New Jersey (Mar. 13, 1979), microformed on CI-7804-89 (Records of
the U.S. Judicial Conference); Letter from Edward Gignoux, District Judge, District of Maine (Mar. 5, 1979), microformed on Cl-7805 44 (Records of the U.S.
Judicial Conference); Letter from Eugene Gordon, Chief Judge, Middle District of
North Carolina (Feb. 20, 1979), microformed on Cl-7806-53 (Records of the U.S.
Judicial Conference); Letter from James Greilsheim-e r, New York County Lawyers' Association (Feb. 28, 1979), microformed on CI-7805 (Records of the U.S.
Judicial Conference) (objecting to the initial proposal due to public interest in ac-
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Despite this campaign, the Advisory Committee supported
the revised 1979 draft, rather· than the original amendment to
Rule 5(d).. Of significance to later developments, the Committee took explicit note of public access, explaining that Hsuch
[discovery] materials are sometimes of interest to those who
may have no access to them except by requirement of filing,
such as members of a class, litigants similarly situated, or the
public generally."138 In the end, the amendment continued the
mandatory filing requirement, but it permitted a court order
prohibiting filing of discovery materials.
The Supreme Court approved the 1979 amendment to Rule
5(d) and submitted it to Congress in August of 1980.139 The
history of the proposal in Congress demonstrates the support
for public access to discovery information and the fear that
even the revised amendm.e nt might jeopardize that right. A
letter to Senator Edward Kennedy, Chairman of the United
States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, from Charles Bai..
ley~ Editor of the Minne-a polis Tribune, June 23, 1980, expressed the concern that even the revised proposal would create the same problems regarding public access as the initial
1978 proposal.l40 Similarly, ,a New York Times editorial, July
.

.

cess to discovery materials); Letter from Robert Kauffman, Clerk, Southern District of illinois (Mar. 12, 1979), microformed on CI-7805-03 (Records of the U.S.
Judicial Conference); Letter from Samuel King, Chief Judge, District of Hawaii
(Mar~ 6, 1979), microformed on Cl-7805-26 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference); Letter from Robert Maxwell, Chief Judge, Northern District of West Virginia (Feb. 22, 1979), microformed on CI-7805-83 (Records of the U.S. Judicial
Conference); Letter from James A. McWhorter, Clerk, Southern District of West
Virginia (Mar. 8, 1979), micro{ormed on CI-780~16 (Records of the U.S. Judicial
Conference); Letter from Marshall Neill, Chief Judge, Eastern District of Washington (Mar~ H, 1979), microformed on CI-7805-14 (Records of the U., S. Judicial
Conference); Letter from David Porter, Judge, Southern District of Ohio (Aug. 1,
1979), microformed on Cl-7610-91 (Records of the· U.S. Judicial Conference); Letter from Otto Skopil, Chief Judge, District of Oregon (Mar. 12, 1979), microformed
on CI-7804-93 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference); Letter from Albert
Stephens, Chief Judge, Central District of California (l\1ar. 9, 1979); microformed
on CI-7805-01 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference); Letter from Warren Urbom, Chief Judge, District of Nebraska (Mar. 5, 1979), microformed on CI-7805
(Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference); Letter from James Von der Heydt, Chief
Judge, District of Alaska (Mar. 1, 1979), microformed on CI_:7805-57 (Records of
the U.S. Judicial Conference); Letter from Laughlin Waters, District Judge, Cen·
tral District of California (Mar. 7, 1979), microformed on Cl-7805-30 (Records of
the U~S. Judicial Conference).
138. · 85 F.R.D. 521, 525 (1980). The Advisory Committee note recognized that
although discovery materials must be· filed, they are often unused.
139.
ld. at 521.
140.
Letter from Charles Bailey, Editor of the Minneapolis Tribune, to Edward
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22, 1980, criticized even the revised amendment's ability to
prevent public access to discovery materials.1 4 1 Robert Drinan,
Chair of the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, made
explicit his understanding that the proposed change would not
e.n courage waiver of filing :a nd that a limit on filing would occur
only when the balance between private and public interests favored the private interests.I42 Gerald Hegel, President of the
Association of Records Managers and Administrators, Inc.,
wrote to Chief Justice Warren Burger suggesting the use of low
cost records centers to deal with the purported administrative
burden of discovery materials.l43 Joseph Spanio, Deputy Director of the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts responded
"[T]he general rule that all such documents are required to be
filed remains in effect. All documents must be filed unless the
court directs otherwise."l44 Finally, Senator Kennedy warned:
It is the expectation of the Senate Judiciary Committee that
relief sought under amended Rule 5(d) will be authorized on
a case-by-case basis and only in circumstances when the
court has explicitly determined that it is unlikely that the
proceeding will be of interest to the general public, members
of a class, or litigants similarly situated, and when the court
has determined that the pretrial materials in a particular
proceeding are very voluminous.l45

Others in Congress expressed similar concerns.I46

l{ennedy, Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary
(June 23, 1980)~ microformed on CI-7712 (Records of the U~S. Judicial Conference).
141.
Paper Justice, N.Y. TIMES, -J uly 22, 1980, at AlB.
142.
Letter from Robert Drinan; Chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, to Joseph Spaniol, Deputy Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts (June 24, 1980), microformed on CI-8207-87 (Records of the
U.S. Judicial Conference).
143-.
Letter from Gerald Hegel, President, Record Manager & Administrators,
to Chief Justice Warren Burger (July 18 1980), microformed on CI-8207--91 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Con£erence).
144.
Letter from Joseph Spanio to Gerald Hegel (July 31, 1980), microformed
on CI8207 -87 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference).
145.
Letter from Edward Kennedy, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, to William Foley, Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts (July 29, 1980), microformed on CI-8207-85 (Records of the U.S. Judicial
Conference).
146.
See, e.g., Letter from Dennis DeConcini to William Foley (July 25_, 1980),
microformed on CI-7712 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference) ("Other members of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary have expressed their concern to me
.

.
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In response, William Foley, the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, wrote to Senator Kennedy:
The rule does contemplate that relief from the requirement
of filing unnecessary discovery materials will be authorized
on a case-by-case basis and then only when the court has
determined that it is unlikely that the proceeding will be of
interest to the general public, members of a class, or litigants similarly situated. . . . The Advisory Committee Note
states that the discovery "materials are sometimes of interest to those who may have no access to them except by arequirement of filing ...." The district courts are thus advised to take these interests into consideration and to
process rule 5(d) motions in accordance with normal motions practice. 147
•

Judge Mansfield defended the revised draft 148 noting that
the amendment would not dispense with the discovery filing
requirement. Rather, filing would be required unless the court,
on its own motion or on a motion of one of the parties, decided
that the public interest would not be served by filing of discovery materials. Judge Mansfield further stated that it was expected that:

over the application of Rule 5(d) and it will be my intention as Chairman of the
Improvements in Judiciary Machinery Subcommittee to monitor the application of
the Rule, and to possibly solicit your assistance in that endeavor.").
147.
Letter from William Foley, Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, to Edward Kennedy, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee (Aug. 26. 1980), microformed on CI-8207-82 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference). See also Letter from Sherman Cohn, Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center, to the Editor of the New York Times, (July
25, 1980), microformed on CI-7713 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference) (also
criticizing the article's comments on the limitation of public access); Letter from
Judge Mansfield to members of the Advisory Committee on Federal Civil Rules
(July 31, 1980), microformed on Cl- 8210·62 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference) (providing a copy of Paper Justice); Letter to the Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure and the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules from Joseph
Spaniol (Aug. 26, 1980), microformed on CI-7712 (Records of the U.S. Judicial
Conference) (providing information pertaining to the amended Rule 5(d)); Letter
to all federal judges, U.S. magistrates, circuit executives, and clerks of court from
Joseph Spaniol (Aug. 26, 1980), microformed on CI-7712 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference) (providing copies of correspondence regarding the amended
Rule 5(d)).
148.
Letter from Judge Mansfield to Max Frankel, Editor of the New York
Times (July 23, 1980), microformed on CI-8210-62 (Records of the U.S·. Judicial
Conference) (criticizing the article Paper Justice by explaining the intended application of the Rule).
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[A] judge would not be expected to excuse parties from filing
materials in any case in which the public or the press had
an interest, such as a Watergate or similar scandal. Moreover, should the public importance of the material not appear until after filing has been excused, it is expected that
the judge, upon motion of the press or other interested persons, would order the parties to file the documents for inspection.149

In an attempt to study the application of the new Rule 5(d), the
district courts were directed by the Administrative Office to
submit information about the application of Rule 5(d) in practice.150

D. The 2000 Amendment to Rule 5
As we have seen, prior to 2000, Rule 5(d) required discovery materials to be promptly flled with the court.l51 One clear
reason for that requirement was to guarantee public access to
information discovered pretrial. The costs incurred by this procedural rule were explicitly acknowledged. Many· districts,
however, had adopted local rules or orders barring parties from
filing discovery.I52 The next change to Rule 5 did away with
public access.
149.

•

Id. The following additional correspondence pertained to the amendment

submitted to Congress: Report to the House Committee on the Judiciary from the
American Law Division (June 30, 1980), microformed on CI-7713-7714 (Records
of the U.S. Judicial Conference) (providing a survey of the local rules regarding
discovery materials); Letter from Philip Pratt, U.S. District Judge, to Judge
Mansfield (July 9, 1982), microformed on Cl-8207- 81 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference) (stating that local rules prohibiting discovery would subvert the
intent of the amended 5(d)).
150. Letter from James McCafferty to the clerks of the U.S. District Courts
(Apr. 17, 1981), microformed on CI-7714 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference)
(requesting more information on the application of the amended 5(d), and including a table on district court orders pertaining to Rule 5(d)); Letter from Joseph
Spaniol to all clerks of the U.S. District Courts (Oct. 20, 1980), microformed on
Cl-7714 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference) (requesting information to
evaluate the impact of the amended Rule 5(d)). The responses showed there were
a total of only forty-five orders entered dispensing the filing requirement in the
following districts between November, 1980 and February, 1981: the Central District of Illinois, the District of Kansas, the Western District of Kentucky, the District of Maine, the District of New Jersey, the District of New Mexico, the Western
District of Pennsylvania, the District of Puerto Rico, and the Middle District of
Tennessee.
151. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d), advisory committee's note, 1980.
152. Laurie Kratky Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confiden-
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In 1996·, the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee,
which monitors the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, began a
re-examination of the discovery rules. Concerns. about the
costs and usefulness of pretrial investigation prompted this reexamination. I53 The Advisory Committee sought to "focus on
the architecture of discovery rules and determine whether
modest changes could be effected to reduce costs of discovery, to
increase its efficiency, to restore uniformity of practice, and to
encourage the judiciary to participate more actively in case
management."I54 A Discovery Subcommittee was appointed to
explore possible revisions to the rules.t55 The Subcommittee
collected and compiled information regarding the pretrial process and commissioned two major studies to gather empirical
data from practicing attorneys about discovery.156 A conference
was also held at the Boston College Law School in September of
1997.157 Mter evaluating the results of the studies and receiving responses from academics, the bar, and interested institutions, the Discovery Subcommittee re.c ommended that the Advisory Committee propose amendments to the rules of
discovery.l58
In March of 1998, the Advisory Committee met and recommended a change in Rule 5(d) as. part
of
an
overall
discovery
.
'

tiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 325, n.170 (1999);
Jack H. Friedenthal, Secrecy in Civil Litigation: Discovery and Party Agreements,
9 J.L. & POL'Y 67, 80 (2000); See, e.g., N.D. & S.D. Iowa L.R. 15(a) (requiring that
discovery materials not be filed). 'lThere [we]re indications that even in districts
that d[id] not have local rules barring filing, nonfiling [wa]s a routine habit with
many attorneys." 181 F.R.D. 18, 38 (Feb. 1999)~
153.
Whether there is "abuse of discovery'' and what constitutes "abuse" is
fiercely contested, but these topics are beyond. the scope of this article. See, e~g.,
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Ruleniaking: Errors of
Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529 (2001).
154. Memor~ndum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules to the Honorable Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure (May 11, 1999) http://www. uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CV
05-1999.pd£ (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
155. Carl Tobias, Congress and the 2000 Federal Civil Rules Amendments, 22
CARDOZO L. REV. 75, 77 (2000).
156.
181 F.R.D. at 25. The Subcommittee was chaired by Judge David F. Levi
of the District Court for the Eastern District of California. The studies were conducted by the Federal Judicial Center ("FJC study''), and the RAND Corporation
Institute for Civil Justice ("Rand study'').
157.
ld. at 35; Transcript of the "Alumni" Panel on Discovery Reform, 39 B.C.
L. REV. 809 (1998).
158.
Tobias, supra note 154, at 78.
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"package." 159 Rule 5 was the tail on that much larger dog. Additions are bolded.

·

tl

(d) FILING; CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. All papers after
the complaint required to be served upon a party, ["shall"]
must be filed with the court within a reasonable time after
service, but ... disclosures under Rule 26(a)(l) or (2)
and the following discovery requests and responses
must not be filed until they are used in the proceeding or the court orders filing: (i) depositions, (ii) interrogatories, (iii) requests for documents or to permit entry upon land, and (iv) requests for
admission. 160

This was, of course, a revival of the initial 1978 proposal and
debate. The Advisory Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, chaired by Judge Paul Niemeyer, heard testimony from
more than 300 witnesses at three public hearings in Baltimore,
Chicago and San Francisco and received more than 300 written
comments submitted by the public. 16 1 Mter considering the
public comments and making a small number of changes, the
Standing Committee submitted the package of discovery
amendments to the Judicial Conference.
In September of 1999, the Judicial Conference tendered
these amendments to the Supreme Court which approved the
package and forwarded it to Congress. Congress took no action, thus ratifying the changes.l62
Mter the 2000 amendments, Rule 5(d) read:
All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a
party, together with a certificate of service, must be filed
with the court within a reasonable time after service, but
disclosures under Rule 26(a)(l) or (2) and the following discovery requests and responses must not be filed until they
are used in the proceeding or the court orders filing: (i)
depositions, (ii) interrogatories, (iii) requests for documents
159.

181 F.R.D. at 39.

160.

MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE-CML § 5APP.l0 2000 Amendment to Sub-

division (d) (LEXIS 2005).
161.
Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, supra note 153, at 3 "[T]he process pursued in connection with the discovery rules package created an unusually
well-informed Committee that acted most selectively to adopt a modest, balanced
package to address identified problems in a manner comfortable to the practicing
bar and to the courts." Id.
162.
Id.
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or to permit entry upon land, and (iv) requests for admission.l63

The pre-2000 Rule required ·discovery materials to be filed
unless exempted by the court, while the revised Rule prohibits
discovery materials from being filed unless they are "used in a
court proceeding," l64 with minor exceptions.165 U n-filed information is now managed by the parties' attorneys and is no
longer assumed to be part of the judicial record. 166 In supporting a motion or in other proceedings, parties may refer to, or
rely upon, only those discovery materials specifically filed.167
A number of justifications were given for the 2000 amendment: (1) the preexisting inconsistency of local rules and the
lack of a uniform national standard;l68 and (2) the expense and
burden of the filing requirement. Previously, many districts
had local rules limiting or excusing filing of discovery, creating
disparity among districts.I69 "[T]he collective wisdom reflected
in so many local rules strongly supports the conclusion that
routine filing of all discovery materials is inappropriate."170

163.
FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d).
164.
1 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 5.33(2) (3d ed.,
1997). "Used in the proceeding" is synonymous with "relevant to a court proce·
dure," ensuring that all relevant material is presented to the court in connection
with the particular procedure at hand. While this phrase includes most activities
in connection with a lawsuit, it _m ost notably does not include depositions. Id.
While the Committee note declares that a court can order the filing of discovery
materials, regardless of whether they are used in a court proceeding, this is not
made explicit in amended Rule 5(d). Rule 5 also supersedes and invalidates all
the local court rules pertaining to the filing or nonfiling of discovery materials.
FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d) advisory committee's note.
165.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(3) (providing no Rule 5 exemption for the disclosure
and exchange of lists of trial evidence) and Rule 35 Requests for a Physical or
Mental Examination. Id.
166.
MOORE, supra note 163, at 5.33[3][a].

167.
168.

ld.
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence, 181 F.R.D. 18, 50 (Admin. Off. of the United States Courts, Feb. 1999) (preliminary draft) "There is no apparent reason to have different filing rules in different districts."
181 F.R.D. at 50. At the Boston conference in 1997, former
Advisory Committee member John Frank stated that "[T]the biggest task of the
Committee at this moment is to try to achieve uniformity. The variance· not
merely between states in the one case, but among districts, ... makes us realize
what was meant to be a fundamental premise of the Rules, names a uniform system for the federal courts, simply doesn't exist." 39 B.C. L. REV. at 811.
169.
FED. R. Crv. P. 5(d). 2000 amendment advisory committee note.
170. 181 F.R.D. at 50.
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Another motivation, however, behind the 2000 .a mendment
was to reduce the cost and burdens allegedly imposed by the
filing requirement. The Advisory Committee noted problems
caused by limited storage space and tedious administrative
burdens in handling large volumes of paper.t7t The amended
rule "will require filing of the materials used the most common illustrations will be uses to support motions, including
summary judgment motions, or use at trial."172
Comments submitted by the public generally supported
changing Rule 5's filing requirement. The American College of
Trial Lawyers, for example, stated, "[i]t [the filing exemption]
will not only reduce costs and expenses for the clerk's office,
but also reduce filing and copy expenses of the parties."l73 The
Federal Magistrate Judge's Association Rule Committee noted
"[t]he amendment is a progression of changes that have occurred since 1990 with a recognition of the costs imposed on
parties as well as the court by the required filing of discovery
materials that are never used in the action."l74
There was, however, also opposition to .a bolishing the filing
requirement of the pre-2000 Rule, particularly the loss of public access to discovery information. The Public Citizen Litigation Group ("Public Citizen"), a national public interest law
firm, oppos_e d the amendment because "[f]iling of discovery materials is particularly important where the suit involves a class
action, or issues of broad public importance, or allegations of
official misconduct."175 Similarly, the District of Columbia Bar
suggested that the Advisory Committee make clear that the
amendment was "not intended to change the principle in the
current Federal Rules that discovery materials should be
available to the public when the public interest in access outweighs any countervailing privacy or other interest."l 76 District Judge David L. Piester also commented. that it was in the
-

.

Paul V~ Niemeyer, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules Memorandum, at 4
(May 11, 1999), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CV05-1999.pdf [hereinafter
Memorandum]. "[F]iling adds burdens and expe.nses not only on the courts but
also on the parties." 181 F .R.D. at 38 .
172.
181 F., R.D. at 39.
173. Memorandum, supra note 170, at 4~
174.
Id. at 7.
175.
Id. at 4. Public Citizen suggested the phrase "must not be filed" be replaced with "need not be filed" in order to provide parties with the choice of incur·
ring costs of filing discovery materials. ]d.
176.
ld. at 4.
171.

.

.
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public interest to allow access to discovery relevant to public
matters, especially in products liability cases.177
In the end, the Rule 5(d) filing requirement w,a s removed.
The reasons for this hardly seem compelling and technologic-a l
ch,a nges would seem to obviate any real necessity for change.
In addition, this amendment removed a key argument for pub·
lie access to discovery material, often affirmed by cases. I turn
now to how such arguments were treated in the federal case
law between 1938 and the p,r esent.

N. FEDERAL COURT CASE LAW ON ACCESS TO DISCOVERY
A. Public Access to Discovery Prior to 1970
The requirement to publicly file discovery with the court
was only implicit in the FRCP until 1970, but access to this
material, and conversely the ability of parties to disclose and
use it, was widely .P ermitted by courts prior to that date.l78 For
instance, in the widely cited Olympic Refining v. Carter case,I79
antitrust plaintiffs sought to depose a government attorney
who was involved in a prior case in which the government had
brought an antitrust action against the same defendants.

177.
Id .. at 4. Judge Piester suggested that the amendment include a provision
requiring non-filed documents to be made available by the parties for inspection,
subject to the power of a court protection order. Id.
178.
See, e.g., United States v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 388
F.2d 201, 204 (3d Cit. 1967) (reversing-district court's grant of injunction staying
federal civil antitrust action during pendency of criminal antitrust action based on
the same events, stating "we know of no rule or equitable principle that protects a
defendant in a pending criminal prosecution from the_disclosure, by another person in a separate civil action, of evidence which may later become part of the
prosecution's case against him."); Olympic Ref. Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260 (9th
Cir. 1964);- Essex Wire Corp. v. E. Elec. Sales Co., Inc., 48 F.R.D. 308 (E.D. Pa.
1969); Brown v. Bullock, 29 F.R.D. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (concluding that plaintiff
may proceed with production); In re Am. Anthracite and Bituminous Coal Co., 22
F.R.D. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); In re Mosher, 248 F.2d 956, 957 (C. C.P.A., 1957) (stating that it is "clear that at common law, no special interest had to be shown for a
member of the public to gain access to judicial records.',); Leonia Amusement
Corp., v. Loew's Inc., 18 F.R.D. 503, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (stating that a party to
an action "should be able to use [information gained in discovery] in any way
which the law permits."); Sagorsky v. Malyon, 12 F.R.D. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (concluding that federal court plaintiff may proceed with depositions intended to be
used in state court action); Desversky v. Republic Aviation Corp., 2 F.R.D. 183
(E.D.N.Y. 1941); but see Beard v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 20 F.R.D. 607 (N.D. Ohio
1957). See infra note 194 for cases after 1970 with similar holdings.
179.
332 F.2d 260, 261 (9th Cir. 1964).
•

•
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Plaintiffs also requested the government attorney produce
documents from the prior litigation.180 The original case had
been settled by a consent decree by the time Olympic was pending, and the discovery material in the earlier case had been
sealed by stipulation of the parties. 181 The government sought
to vacate the prior protective orders to permit access for use in
the pending action.I82 The Ninth Circuit granted the motion,
stating:
In the federal judicial system trial and pretrial proceedings
are ordinarily to be conducted in public .... The purpose of
the federal discovery rules, as pointed out in Hickman v.
Taylor, is to force a full disclosure.l83

The Ninth Circuit further observed that because "all these
documents had been filed in the district court in the government case, Olympic could have examined the filed originals and
would not have to seek copies from a government official were
it not for the existence of certain protective orders ...."184
Discovery access opponents have focused on the term pretrial proceedings in this and other cases as limited to discovery
materials used in judicial action rather than to normal discovery between parties, or what is sometimes referred to as raw
fruits of discovery. 185 In Olympic, however, no reference is
made to preliminary hearings or other judicial involvement in
either case utilizing information gleaned
from discovery .
.
Rather, the court's discussion of pretrial proceedings simply
•

180.

Id. at 262 (noting that the requested documents included "answers,
amended answers, and supplemental answers to defendants' interrogatories and
all documents and papers related thereto.").
18L ld. at 261.
182. Id.
183. ld. at 264 (internal citations omitted).
184. Id. at 262.
185. See United States v. Hooker Chemicals and Plastics Corp., 90 F.R.D. 421,
426 (W.D.N.Y. 1981) (declining to impose a protective order on information that
had yet to be submitted with any pre· trial or substantive motions, stating "(u]se of
the discovery fruits disclosed in one lawsuit in connection with other litigation,
and even in collaboration among plaintiffs' attorneys, comes squarely within the
purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); In re Agent Orange Prod.
Liab. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 559, 565 (E.D.N.Y 1985) (''The second category of documents represents the raw fruits of discovery. These documents have never been
filed with the Court."); Id. at 570 ("If access to protected fruits can be granted
without harm to legitimate secrecy interests, or if no such interests exist, continued judicial protection cannot be justified." (quoting Nonparty Access to Discovery
Materials in Federal Courts, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1085, 1092 (1981))).
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references information gained by parties in FRCP-enforced information gathering. The discovery material sought included
"answers to ... interrogatories and all documents and papers
related thereto."l86 This material was available because "all of
these documents had been filed," 181
Although an antitrust case, Olympic did not rely on the
special antitrust disclosure statute that requires depositions in
.g overnment antitrust litigation to be "ope.n to the public as
freely as are trials in open court." 188 At most, the court saw the
statute as reflective of pre-existing policies, including those
embodied in the FRCP. Nor did other courts in this pre-1970
era limit access to discovery in antitrust matters. For instance,
Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Electric Sales Co.~ 1 89 was a contract
dispute in which plaintiffs sought to disregard informal ''secrecy provisions" agreed to during the course of a deposition
and to reveal to third parties various details of the disputed
contract.l90 Citing Olympic, the court stated: "as a general
proposition, trial and pre-trial proceedings of the federal judicial s_y stem are ordinarily conducted in public."l91 Numerous
other cases from this period acknowledge the right to access
.

. .

discovery.I92

During this historical period, judges were often involved in
the conduct of discovery. ·M any cases permitted discovery despite the fact that a party intended to use the discovery in either a parallel state action or a related pro.c eeding in another
federal court or even in state_cases.I93 In Sagorsky v. Malyon,

186.

Olympic Ref. Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260, 262 (9th Cir. 1964).
187.
Id. (emphasis added).
188.
ld. at 264 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 30 (repealed 2002)). The Olympic court supported access for third parties by reference to the Federal Rules, the open nature
of trials, and the Supreme Court's Hickman ruling: "[t]his basic policy has been
specifically applied in the field of Government antitrust litigation."
189.
48 F.R.D. 308, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
190.
ld.
191.
ld. ''Pre-trial proceedings" are not defined, but here, as in Olympic, there
is no mention of' any other pretrial hearings or motions involving the court so as to
distinguish between "pretrial proceedings" and "discovery material." Id.
192.
In re Am. Anthracite and Bituminous Coal Co., 22 F.R.D. 504, 508 (S.D.
N.Y. 195B) (".[l]t is no objection to the examination that the deposition may be
used in some other action or proceeding if it is relevant to the pending action.").
De.s eversky v. Republic Aviation Corp, 2 F.R.D. 183 (E.D. N.Y. 1941), decided soon
after the adoption of the FRCP, provides a similar example in the context of a
shareholders' derivative action.
193.
See Deering Milliken Research Corp. v. Leesona Corp., 27 F.R. D. 440
(E.D.N~Y. 1961) (approving federal court discovery sought to be used in parallel
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for example, the court permitted discovery, noting that the
parallel state court action "does not, in the absence of a showing of bad faith ... deprive a plaintiff of the right to avail itself
of the deposition-discovery -procedure under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure."194 Another decision notes that "[i]t is settled law that discovery processes are proper even though the
depositions may be used in some collateral proceeding."195
These results do not mean that pretrial information was
always available to third parties or could be used for any purpose. The vast majority of cases were resolved on the basis of
whether good cause had been shown for a protective order under Rule 26(c). Parties may well have legitimate privacy, business or other interests which might justify denying access ~nd
many cases so held. 196 Courts are routinely engaged in balancing these interests. An illustrative example from this period is
Essex v. Wire Corp., 197 which upheld the release of information
generated during discovery but maintained the protection of
specific contract terms on the basis of the potential competitive
disadvantage imposed on the party by their release.198 "[l]f
this information were disclosed, the moving party would suffer
great competitive disadvantage and irreparable harm.''199
patent claim action); Brown v. Bullock, 29 F.R.D. 184 (S.D.N.Y 1961) (federal
court discovery utilized in state court proceeding under Investment Company Act
claim); In re Am. Anthracite and Bituminous Coal Co., 22 F.R.D. 504 (S.D.N.Y
1958); Leona Amusement Corp. v. Loews Inc., 18 F.R.D. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (refusing protective order over defendants objection that discovery was sought for
use by other attorneys); Sagorsky v. Malyon, 12 F.R.D. 486 (S.D.N.Y 1952) (permitting federal court discovery in insurance claim in state court action); Deseversky v. Republic Aviation Corp., 2 F.R.D. 183 (E.D. N.Y. 1941) (permitting use of
discovery in separate proceeding in stockholders action).
194. 12 F.R.D. 486, 487 (S.D. NY 1952). There were, to be sure, a few contrary
decisions. In Union Carbide Corp. v. Filtrol, 278 F. Supp. 553, 559 (D.C. Cal.
1967), Mobil Oil Corporation, a non-party to a patent action, sought to modify existing protective orders to gain access to flied information. The court denied Mobil's request, distinguishing other cases because they were antitrust matters. Id.
at 559.
195.
Deering Milliken Research Corp. v. Leesona Corp., 27 F.R.D. 440, 441
(E.D.N.Y. 1961) (citing American Anthracite and Deseversky supra note 186).
196. See Carr v. Monroe Mfg. Co., 431 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1970); Covey Oil Co.
v. Cont'l Oil Co., 340 F2d 993 (lOth Cir. 1965); lnt'l Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325
F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1963); Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 431
(N.D. Ill. 1976); United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 193 F. Supp. 254 (S.D.N.Y.
1961).
197.
Essex Wire Corp. v. E. Elect. Sales Co., Inc., 48 F.R.D. 308 (E.D. Pa.
1969).
198. Id. at 312.
199.
Id. at 310.
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B, From 1970-1980
As discussed earlier,200 Rule 5 was amended in 1970 to
make explicit that discovery materials must be filed in court.
The Rule- was next amended in 1980 and the cases between
1970-80 presented a greater variety of factual circumstances
than earlier cases. The debate about the use of, and access to,
discovery became more vigorous, but the case law, with few exceptions, followed the pre-1970 pattern.20l Some cases specifically approved disclosure of discovery information for general
public release.202 In Williams v. Johnson & Johnson,203 for ex·
ample_, defendant sought to prohibit the plaintiff from rele_a sing
depositions generated in litigation over the contraceptive Ortho
Novum because the company claimed plaintiffs were "promoting litigation" an_d because the deposition had already been
used by the author, Barbara Seaman, in the book The Doctor's
Case Against the Pill.204 The motion for a protective order was

200.

See supra Part III. B.
201.
See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v
Grady, 594 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1978) (treating non-party government request to
vacate protective order as a matter of ftrst impression and granting request to
disclose previously protected discovery); Gen. Dynamics v. Selb Mfg., 481 F.2d
1204 (8th Cir. 1973) (requiring defendant in civil action to respond to interrogatories despite claim of self incrimination under the 5th amendment); Patterson v.
Ford Motor Co., 85 F.R.D. 152 (W.D. Tex. 1980); Parsons v. Gen .. Motors, 85
F~R.D. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Krause v. Rhodes, 535 F. Supp 33.8 (N.D. Ohio 1979);
Burgess Const. Co. v. Willamette-Western Corp., 80 F.R.D. 477 (D. Alaska 1978)
(permitting state of Alaska, as non-party, to access discovery material); Am. Ben.
Life Ins. Co. v. Ille, 87 F.R.D. 540 (D. Okla. 1978); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's,
428 F. Supp. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (denying plaintiffs motion for a protective order
that sought to limit corporate record discovery to the action); Alliance to End ReM
pression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 431 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Johnson Foils Inc. v. Huyck,
61 F.R.D. 405 (N.D.N.Y. 1973) (denying defendant's motion for a protective order
sought on basis of plaintiffs use of discovery in a separate forum); Williams v.
Johnson & Johnson, 50 F.R.D. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); but see In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 457 F. Supp. 210 (N.D., Tex. 1978).
202.
In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1979). "Generally speaking;
when a party obtains documents or information through the discovery process, he
can use that information in any way which the law permits .... [t]he implication is
clear that without a protective orde.r materials obtained in discovery may be used
by a party for any purpose, including dissemination to the public." Id. at 188 (internal quotation omitted).
203.
50 F.R.D. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
204.
Id. at 33.
'

.
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denied.205 The court stated that ''by simple docketing in the
court, this deposition would become public material."206
The cases from this period also support the principle that
filed discovery material ceases to be available only when protected by a valid protective order. An example is Alliance to
End Repression v. Rochford,201 which held that some specific
information regarding Chicago Police surveillance tactics warranted protection from access by non parties but otherwise, "all
documents filed and proceedings held in federal civil litigation
are open as a matter of public record."208 Similarly, American
Telephone and Telegraph v~ Grady209 involved a government
request, as a third-party, for information generated in discovery in antitrust litigation between AT&T and MCI. The information was sealed by stipulated protective order.210 The district court granted the government's motion to vacate the
protective order noting "pretrial discovery must take place in
the public unless compelling reasons exist for denying public
access to the proceedings."2ll
Krause v. Rhodes,212 another well known and widely cited
case, enunciated similar doctrinal principles. The dispute over
access to discovery occurred after the original case was settled.213 Citing the ''historic" nature of the Kent State shootings
underlying the case, plaintiffs intended to turn over pretrial information to the Yale University library as well as to the Ohio
214
Historical Society.
The discovered material included grand
ld.
206. ld. The case makes no mention of pretrial proceedings or other motions
.
that would undercut the court's equating of "docketing" with the deposition's
status as "public material." Id.
207.
75 F.R.D. 431 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
208.
Id. at 433 (emphasis added).
209.
594 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1978).
210. I d. at 595.
211. The importance of the AT&T holding is enhanced by the fact that by this
time, courts had become more reluctant to treat the government as simply another third-party. See, e.g., Martindell v. Int'l Tel. & Tel., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir.
1979) (denying government access to information and noting its "awesome investigative powers.").
212.
535 F. Supp. 338 (N.D. Ohio 1979). The case involved the civil suits
brought by the relatives of individuals killed in the Kent State shootings.
213. Id. at 342.
214~
Id. at 343. Material produced by the Ohio Highway Patrol and the Ohio
National Guard had already been turned over to the Kent State University library. ld. at 351. The court did state that "Although they are in the constructive
custody of the court, these discovery materials would only be part of the 'official
court records open to the public' to the extent they have entered the public do205.
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jury testimony, FBI interview reports, testimony of witnesses
before state grand juries, police radio logs, witness statements,
photographs and eighty ..three depositions.215 Relying heavily
on Halkin, the court permitted disclosure of most of this infor ..
mation, except material that qualified under the protective order standard.2l6

C. From 1980-2000
Section III. C. described the history of the 1980 amendment
to Federal Rule 5(d) . 217 While the initial proposed rule change
would have made discovery non-fileable except where a court so
ordered, vigorous opposition forced a change in the final form of
the amendment to require filing except when a court ordered it
otherwise. ln 2000, Rule 5(d) was amended to explicitly forbid
filing of discovery·. In the interim, many district courts adopted
local rules which were contrary to the 1980 version of the rule,
Practice likewise varied.
A substantial body of federal case law developed during
these twenty years regarding access to, and use of, discovery
material. These cases included a United States Supreme Court
ruling and numerous decisions in the lower courts. Three major themes defined the debate: claims of access based upon the
First Amendment, the common law, and the Federal Rules.
Courts discussed these themes in a nuanced and careful way,
often reaching conflicting results. The following sections follow
these three threads.
'

1.

First Amendment Right of Access

In In re Halkin,2IS the D.C. Circuit held that a trial court
protective order barring dissemination of approximately three
thousand pages of CIA and NSA information operated as a

main. Only the latter materials would be subject to the common-law right to in·
spect and copy, a general right recognized in Nixon v. Warner Communications,
Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-99, 98 S. Ct. 1306, 1311-12, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978)." Id. at
347.
215.
Id. at 347.
216.
Jd.
217.
See supra notes 109-147 and accompanying text. The public controversy
over this seemingly technical change reflects the importance attached, at least
then, to public access to pretrial discovery.
218.
In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir~ 1979)~
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prior restraint, violating the First Amendment.219 In addition
to the usual considerations for issuance of a protective order, a
court "must take account of the important public interests in
the functioning of the discovery process, and the unique characteristics of that process, as well as the First Amendment interest in unfettered expression."220 The district court's order
was "seriously infirm," because it had "made no evaluation of
the First Amendment interests at stake."221
In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 222 the Supreme Court
overruled Balkin's First Amendment conclusions. Rhinehart, a
founder of an unusual religious organization called the Aquarian Foundation,223 filed suit against the Seattle Times based on
published articles which allegedly subjected him to "public
scorn, hatred and ridicule."224 In the course of discovery, the
defendant newspaper sought information from Rhinehart that
included tax returns and lists of members of, and donors to, the
Aquarian Foundation.225 Rhinehart resisted disclosure of this
information and sought a protective order.226 The paper opposed the protective order on First Amendment grounds because it intended to "continue publishing articles about [Rhinehart.]"227
The trial court prohibited publication or
dissemination of the discovered material under Rule- 26(c) of
the state rules.228 The Seattle Times appealed.229
Recognizing the "unique position that such orders occupy
in relation to the First Amendment,"230 the Supreme Court
first determined that a protective order does not present "the
kind of classic prior restraint that requires exacting First
Amendment scrutiny."231 Protective orders further a "substantial government interest," namely the court's support and con-

219.

Balkin, 598 F.2d at 185 ("A judicial order restraining speech casts the
judge in a role comparable to that of a censor.").
220. Id. at 191.
221. Id. at 196.
222. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
223. Id. at 22. It held beliefs in life after death and contacting the dead
through mediums. Rhinehart was the primary medium. Id.
224. Id. at 23.
225. Id. at 24.
226. Id. at 25.
227. ld.
228..
ld. at 27.
229. Rhinehart v. Seattle Times, Co., 654 P.2d 673 (Wash. 1982).
230. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984).
231. Id. at 33.
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trol over liberal discovery and the prevention of abuse of the
discovery proces.s.232 "[W]here, as in this case, a protective order is entered on a showing of good cause as required by Rule
26(c), is limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery, and
does not restrict the dissemination of the information if .g ained
from other sources, it does not offend the First Amendment."233
As a result, no unconstitutional "prior restraint" is created
when a trial court specifically evaluates individual private interests and issues a protective order.234 It was thus clear that
despite public filing of discovery, a court may make an individual determination to keep discovered material sealed. At the
same time, the Court recognized that parties also have general
First Amendment freedoms with regard to information gained
through discovery and that, "absent a valid court order to the
contrary, the.y are entitled to disseminate the information .a s
they see fit." 2 35
2.

A Presumptive Common Law Right of Access

During 1980-2000; the "common law" right of access to
discovery information was increasingly seen by courts as independent of the First Amendment. Courts routinely used a bal·a ncing test assessment of whether the common law right provided third-party access, despite various other factors that
would otherwise have placed the information out of reach.236

ld. at 35.
I d. at 37. The plaintiffs had submitted evidence of threats and harass·
ment. Id. at 2.6. This was more than sufficient proof to w·a rrant protection from
further dissemination. ld. at 37. Justice Powell, a long;.time opponent of broad
discovery, wrote that "pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not public components of a civil trial'' and emphasized that trial courts may control discovery as
well as trial. ld. at 33 & n.19.
234.
Id. at 33. The Court also commented on the impact of the filing requirement:
Jurisdictions that require filing of discovery materials customarily pro~
vide that trial courts may order that the materials not be filed .o r that
they be filed under; seal. Federal district courts may adopt local rules
providing that the fruits of discovery are not to be filed except on order of
the court. Thus, to the extent that courthouse records could serve as a
source of public information, access to that source customarily is subject
to the control of the trial court.
Id. at n.19 (internal citations omitted).
235.
Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 780 (1st Cit. 1988) (citing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 31-36 (1984)).
236.
Such as protective orders, assertions of attorney-client privilege, and the
232.
233.
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Often, the dispute arose following the filing and sealing of the
discovered information.
For instance, in West Virginia v. Moore,231 the State sought
"civil recovery for certain alleged corrupt acts" from former
state governor Arch Moore238. The former governor was deposed twice and the case was settled. Mter settlement, a newspaper and the Associated Press intervened seeking access to
the. depositions.239 The ·court found that the depositions themselves had never been filed, and thus were not judicial documents subject to a right of access.240 However, regarding the
excerpts filed under seal with motions, the court granted access
holding that they could only remain under seal "if countervailing interests heavily outweigh the public's interest in access."241
Similarly, in Hagestad v. Tragesser, the Oregon State Bar
sought access to sealed records, including a deposition, regarding Hagestad's allegations of sexual abuse against an attorney,
Tragesser.242 The case had been settled. The State Bar, maintaining its own disciplinary action, argued that the ''district
court abused its discretion by sealing its file and, thus, denying
the State Bar access to the eourt's records."243 The Circuit
court did not evaluate the matter simply by determining
whether the sealing order met the good cause standard under
Rule 26. Instead, the court addressed the strong presumption
of access that attaches to judicial documents, describing a
separate balancing approach that begins with a presumption of
access and weighs the "public interest in understanding the judicial process'' against "whether disclosure of the material
could result in improper use of the material."244 Further, "the
district court must base jts decision on a compelling reason and
articulate the factual basis for its ruling."245
work product doctrine.
237. 902 F. Supp. 715 (S.D. W.Va. 1995).
238.,
ld. at 716.
239. ld.
240. Id. at 717.
241.
Id. at 718 (quoting Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249,
253 (4th Cir. 1988)).
242. 49 F.3d 1430, 1431-32 (9th Cir. 1995).,
243.
ld. at 1434.
244.
Id. (quoting EEOC v. Erection Co.,. Inc., 900 F.2d 168, 170 (9th Cir. 1990)).
245. Id. The circuit court remanded the case, directing the district court to
make findings in support of sealing the record. ld. at 1435. See also In re Perrigo
Co., 128 F. 3d 430, 440 (6th Cir. 1997) (denying access to an internal investigative
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a. Determining What Is a Judicial Document
During 1980-2000, the common law right increasingly
came to be characterized as the right to ''judicial documents,'" a
term subject to varying definitions across the federal courts.
Numerous cases routinely des_c ribe the right of access as a
"pervasive . . . right to inspect and copy public records and
documents, including judicial records and documents.';246 This
right, "which antedates the Constitution ... is now beyond dispute."247 But what defines a "judicial document?" The circuit
courts developed a series of inconsistent answers to this question.248 If a document was in fact filed, it was publicly available.249

One court summarized the split among the circuits reg_a rding the "judicial document" definition as follows:

report prepared by a corporation because there were "myriad" laws and regulations regarding corporate reporting and the public had alternative means of accessing the information).
246. Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Tech., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir.
1993) (internal quotations omitted); see also San J9se Mercury -N ews, Inc. v. U.S.
Dist. Court-N. Dist. (San Jose); 187 F.3d 1096, 1102--03 (9th Cir. 1999); Citizens
First Nat'l Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943, 945 (7th Cir.
1999); United States v. Amodeo, 44 F~ 3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995); Pansy v. Borough
of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 780-81 (3d Cir. 1994); FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt
Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 408 (1st Cir. 1987); In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820
F.2d 352, 355 (11th Cir. 1987); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d l, 13 (1st Cir.
1986); Bank ofAm. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assoc., 800 F.2d
339, 343 (3d Cir. 1986); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d
1165, 1177-78 (6th Cir. 1983).
247. Leucadia, 998 F.2d at 161 (internal quotations omitted).
248.
See Doe v. Blue Cross Blue Shield ofMd., 103 F. Supp. 2d 856, 857 n.l (D.
Md. 2000) (noting that "the consensus among other Courts of Appeal is that the
documents must in some way have been filed with the court"). The Doe court fur·
ther found that ''[a]ny party, or the public at large, may of course seek access to
documents filed with the Court." Id. at n.2. Other courts, on the other hand, held
that material becomes a judicial document "when a .c ourt uses it in determining
litigants' substantive rights_.'~ West Virginia v. Moore, 902 F. Supp. 715, 717 (S.D.
W.Va. 1995) (quoting In re Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., Nos. 94-2254 & 94-23411995,
WL 541623 (4th Cir. Sept. 13, 1995)); see also Cryovac, 805 F.2d at 13 ( "[T]he
common law presumption does not encompass discovery materials. The courts
have not extended it beyond materials on which a court relies in determining the
litigants' substantive rights.").
249.
Doe, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 857. In Doe, the parties conducted a significant
amount of discovery without filing the documents with the court; the effect of the
court's decision was that the intervenors were not permitted access to 20,000
pages that had been exchanged but not filed. Id.
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Some circuits adopt the view that any document on file with
the court is a judicial document. Other circuits take the
view that "the mere filing of a paper or document with the
court is insufficient to render that paper a judicial document subject to right of public access;" rather, the document
must be "relevant to the performance of the judicial function
and useful in the. judicial process." 250
.

.

.

b. Stage of the Proceeding
The "judicial document" determination (and consequently
the right of access under the common law approach) was increasingly described in terms of the stage of the proceeding and
the use made of the discovery information. Some courts con·
eluded that the production of discovery, even absent any filing
with the· court, produced a "weak" right of access which, by the
time information was submitted with dispositive motions, was
a strong right. Other courts based their "judicial document"
finding on the "technical" question of simply whether the material had been filed.25I
Courts in the D.C. Circuit defined a judicial document ac-cording to "the role it plays in the adjudicatory process."252
Others described the common law right of access as subject to
variable strength, based on its particular use in adjudication.253 On the other hand, in In re Adobe Systems,254 the disMoore, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 717 (internal citations omitted).
251.
See, e.g., Pansy, 23 F.3d at 782.
252. Jn reApplication of A.H. Belo Corp., 66 F. Supp. 2d.. 47, 48 (D.D.C. 1999)
(citing United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3.d 158, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
253. Cumberland Packing Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 184 F.R.D. 504, 505
(E.D.N.Y. 1999).
[A] "judicial document" [is] material filed with the cou~t that is "relevant
to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial
process." How strong a "presumption of access'' is accorded a document
will vary with its role in the adjudicatory process. Evidence introduced
at trial is given an "especially strong'; presumption of access. Likewise, a
document submitted as the principal basis for a dispositive motion is ·
given a strong presumption.... Documents that play no role in the performance of Article III functions, such as materials exchanged during
discovery, are given no presumption of access.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also SEC v. Thestreet.com, 273 F.3d 222 (2d
Cir~ 2001). The case, decided after the 2000 amendment to Rule 5(d) balancing,
described the basic approach:
[D]ocuments that play no role in the performance of Article III functions,
such as. those passed between the parties in discovery, lie entirely beyond
the presumption's reach and stand on a different footing than a motion
250.
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trict court, relying on Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
FTC,255 stated that the Sixth Circuit also holds that a ''public
right of access attaches when a document is filed."256 The court
described a continuum of access rights, noting the presumption
of access is "'weakest regarding documents produced by a party
or witness but not file-d with the court."257 The presumption is
"stronger" when documents are filed, "stronger yet" when relied
upon in a dispositive motion, and ~'strongest" when used in evidence at triaJ.258
3.

Access Based on the Federal Rule.s

Though a ''common law" rationale was often applied, cases
decided between 198.0 -2000 also included discussion of a presumption· of access to discovery material created by the combination of the Rule 5(d) filing requirement and the Rule 26 good
cause provision. Courts, not surprisingly, recognized that the
rules may both create access and deny or limit it. Consequently, though noting the presumption for access, courts typically decided whether a Rule 5(d) right existed on the basis of
whether the protective order was properly granted according to
Rule 26(c)... When no such protective order was in place, Rule 5
alone provided access.
·
This was the conclusion in the leading case discussing the
right of access under the FRCP. In In re "Agent Orange, '-259 a

filed by a party seeking action by the court, or, indeed, than any other
document which is presented to the court to invoke its power or affect its
decisions.,,
ld. at 232 (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1050 (2d ·Cir. 1995))
(emphasis in original). The testimony in question "did not directly affect an adju·
dication nor does it significantly determine litigants' substantive rights. To this
extent, the documents are similar to material related to settlement discussions
and documents, which we have concluded do not carry a presumption of public access. " ld. at 233 (internal quotations and citations omitted) ..
254.
In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 141 F~R.D. 155 (N~D. CaL 1992) ..
255.
710 F.2d 116'5 (6th Cir. 1983).
In re Adobe Sys., 141 F.R.D. at 160.
256.
257.
Id. at 157 (emphasis added).
258.
ld. at 157-58.
259.
In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 104 F.R.D. 559, 568
(E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 821 F!2d 13.9, 145-46 (2d Cir. 1987); see .a.ls.o In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceeding in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 101 F.R.D.
34, 41 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (noting that the rules- create a right "as to filed documents
that have never been submitted into evidence, read into the record or submitted
in connection with a pretrial motion" but that "the public access interest is rela ·
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class of Vietnam veterans brought a product liability action
against private and governmental defendants.260 Judge George
C. Pratt entered an order permitting the private defendants to
file under seal any records containing "confidential developmental, business, research or commercial information."26I A
blanket order with respect to all documents and depositions in
the case was then entered by the special master overseeing discovery, who found good cause for his order based upon the
case's "complexity," "emotionalism," and the "number of docu~
ments yet to be reviewed."262 Government documents, including medical records, were made subject to a separate order.263
The court ordered a partial lifting of the protective orders
based upon the use of portions of the discovery material in
summary judgment motions. 264 The court then treated. what it
referred to as "the raw fruits of discovery,"265 concluding that
the federal rules presumptively make discovery open, subject
only to the Rule 26 good cause standard.266 Rule 5(d) mandates
that all discovery material be filed with the court unless the
court orders otherwise because "such materials are sometimes
of interest to those who may have no access to them except by a
requirement of filing, such as members of a class, litigants
similarly situated, or the public generally."267 No good cause
had be.e n demonstrated, and the material was released.268
Similarly~ in In re Consumers Power Co., the court provided a thorough discussion of Rule 5(d), shortly after the 1980

tively weak and is grounded only in the Federal Rules it does not derive from
either the first amendment or the common law").
260.
In re ''Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 818 F.2d 145, 148 (2d
Cir. 1987).
261.
In re '"Agent Orange," 104 F.R.D. at 563.
262.
Id.
263.
Id.
264. Id. at 564.
265.
ld. at 565..
266.
I d. at 567.
267.
FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d) (1982) advisory committee's note (Rule 5(d) amended
1991 & 2000). "Of course, federal district courts may adopt local rules that direct
the parties not to file discovery materials except on order of the court .... Thus,
both Rule 26(c) and Rule 5(d) require that discovery is presumptively open to public scrutiny unless a valid protective order directs otherwise.'" In re "Agent Orange," 104 F.R.D. at 568 (emphasis in original).
268.
Some of the protective orders were entered on the basis of factors that are
not part of the Rules definition of good cause (i.e. ''complexity," "emotionalism,"
and the "number of documents yet to be reviewed"). In re "Agent Orange,'; 104
F.R.D~ at 563.
.

.

.

.
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amendment.269 The court noted that "a deposition is_a public
document freely open to inspection after it is filed with the
clerk."270 Recognizing that the 1980 amendments to Rule 5(d)

permitted the court to preclude filing, and the local rules
merely delayed filing, the. court state.d that the local rules were
intended to address "serious problems of storage" and not to
"reduce third party access to pretrial discovery ."271
The Advisory Committee Notes acknowledge the interests of
those who may have no access to them except by a require·
ment of filing, such as members of a class, litigants similarly situated, or the public generally. Accordingly, this
amendment and a change in Rule 30(f)(l) continue the requirement of filing ....272

In Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc.,273 another widely
cited case, access to discovery information was sought to discovery materials not previously designated as. confidential.
The court equated the filing requirement of Rule 5(d) with the
right of access and discussed contrary local rules:
Under Local Rule 16(g), the parties to this case were ... excused from filing discovery materials in court. The effect of
this nonfiling was to deny the public the right it would oth269.
In re Consumers Power Co. Sec. Litig., 109 F.R.D. 45, 50 (E.D. Mich.
1985). The court, as in many cases, granted the press standing to intervene for
the purpose of seeking access. ld. at 51.
270.
ld. at 50.
271.
ld .. (internal quotation omitted).
272.
Id. (internal quotation omitted); accord Leary v~ Geoghan, Nos . .99-0371 &
9'9·1109, .2 001 WL 1902393 at *6 (M·a ss. Super. Nov. 26, 2001).
As discussed earlier in this decision, Rule 5(d)(l) of the Massachusetts
Rules of Civil Procedure specifically requires parties to file Rule 33(a)
and Rule 36 discovery. Rule 5(d)(2) provides that depositions and Rule
34 discovery will not be filed unless the court otherwise orders. The
purpose of Rule 5(d)(2) is not to imbue a party with a general privilege of
non-disclosure of depositions and Rule 34 discovery; but rather was en·
acted for administrative purposes only namely, to .e ase the paper stor·
age burden in the offices of the clerks of courts. The plain language of
Rule 5(d)(2) makes it abundantly clear that the storage space problems
should not trump the right of the public to request that depositions and
Rule 34 discovery be filed. In fact, the rule provides that a citizen may
request, and the court should consider~ whether depositions and Rule 34
discovery should be filed in all public case files, not in just a particular
case.
I d.
273. 858 F.2d 775 (1st Cir. 1988).
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erwise have had to inspect freely the discovery materials in
this case, because the materials were not kept in any publicly accessible location.... Indeed, the Supreme Court has
noted that parties have general first amendment freedoms
with regard to information gained through discovery and
that, absent a valid court order to the contrary, they are entitled to disseminate the information as they see fit.274

Because the case had settled, court was without jurisdiction to
require the parties to file discovery material sought by the intervenors,275 but the court permitted them to seek modification
of the protective order based on the presumption of access arising solely from Rule 26(c).276 If good cause was not shown, the
discovery material may be open for inspection by anyone. Any
other result would negate the clear Ru~e 26 requirement for a
protective order.277
San Jose Mercury News, decided on the eve of the 2000
amendment to Rule 5(d), expressly found the federal rulesbased right sufficient to unseal discovery material protected by
stipulation of the parties.278 The district court permitted dis274.

Id. at 780 (citing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20,

31~36

(1984)).
275.
Id. at 781.
276.
Id. at 789.
277. Id. (citing In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 821 F.2d 139,
145-46 (2d Cir. 1987). United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 90 F.R.D.
421, 426 (W.D.N.Y. 1981), echoed this.
Use of the discovery fruits disclosed in one lawsuit in connection with other litiga·
tion, and even in collaboration among plaintiffs' attorneys, comes squarely within
the purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. . . . We perceive no intention
in the Federal Rules that incidental benefits of liberal federal discovery should not
accrue to litigants in state courts who are pursuing ancillary lawsuits, provided
there is no attempt to exploit the federal litigation discovery process solely to as·
sist litigation in a foreign forum.
Id. See also United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1158-60 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that federal
rules create presumption of access to civil discovery materials sufficient to satisfy
False Claims Act provision barring qui tam actions based on publicly disclosed
information); Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1980); Am.
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Grady, 594 F:2d 594, 597 (7th Cir. 1978); Doe v. William
Shapiro, Esquire, P.C., 852 F. Supp. 1256, 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ("The filing of a
document with the court gives rise to a presumptive right of public access."); In re
Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 101
F.R.D. 34, 38-41 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
278. San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court-N. Dist. (San Jose), 187
F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999). The case involved a sexual harassment suit
·brought by two Mountain View, California, female police officers. The defendants
conducted an investigation of the claim and after the suit was brought resisted
.

.
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covery of defendants' internal report and also entered a protective order, stipulated by the parties, apparently without a
showing of good caus-e.279 After granting intervention, the appellate court acknowledg-e d the newspaper's right of access
based on the federal common law., and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure; however, the court left the issue of whether
the First Amendment was applicable to a prejudgment right of
access to court records for another day. 280
''It is well-established that the fruits of pretrial discovery
are, in the absence of a court order to the contrary, presump·
tively public. Rule 26(c) authorizes a district court to override
this presumption where 'good cause' is shown."281

D. From 2000-2006
While decisions during the period from 1980 through 2000
often considered the right of access under three separate rationales the First Amendment, the FRCP, and the common
law after 2000 this discussion has been largely displaced. The
opportunity to examine pretrial information is increasingly
constricted.
Following Seattle Times, a First Amendment claim has no
greater deference than the Rule 26(c) standard for granting a
protective order.282 Courts also concluded that the 2000
amendment's elimination of the filing requirement under Rule
5(d) did away with any claim based on that rule. For instance,
in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Thestreet.com,283 the
court held that there was no presumption of filing all discovery
materials or public access to materials that were not filed.284

disclosure of the report. Id. at 1098.
279.
Id. at 1098, 1103.
280.
Id. at 1102. ''We have expressly recognized that the federal common law
right of access extends to pretrial documents filed in civil cases . ., . Other circuits
have expressly recognized that the common law right reaches documents filed in
connection with motions for summary judgment." Id. (internal citations omitted).
281.
Id. at 1103 (internal citations omitted). The court remanded the case to
the district court to determine the propriety of the intervention. ld.
282.
See supra text accompanying notes 221---31.
283.
273 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2001).
284.
Id. at 233, n.ll.· Further, the court stated that "the rule now prohibits the
filing of certain discovery materials unless they are used in the proceeding or the
court orders filing." Id. (emphasis in original).
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To the contrary, Rule 5(d) now prohibited filing discovery materials in most instances.285
Similarly, in Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc.,286 the circuit court criticized the trial court's conclusion
that documents filed with the court are judicial records and
subject to access by the press.287 Notwithstanding that access
to discovery material in the Bridgestone!Firestone litigation
was sought in the district court prior to the 2000 amendment to
Rule 5(d), the court concluded the filing requirement created no
right of access. 288 "The prospect of all discovery material being
presumptively subject to the right of access would likely lead to
an increased resistance to discovery requests."289 Although an
argument can still be made that, absent a judicially-created
protective order, discovery material is still open, that position
appears weak.
Cases after 2000, however, still grapple with various common law presumptions regarding access. Courts note that no
presumption of access attaches to documents merely produced
during discovery or used only with non-dispositive pretrial motions; such material is now not considered a "judicial document," and consequently is not subject to the common law presumption of access.290 For instance, in Thestreet.com the court
stated that:
The Confidential Testimony is deposition discovery material, which we have concluded are documents that play no
role in the performance of Article III functions. The testimony did not directly affect an adjudication nor does it significantly determine litigants' substantive rights. To this
extent, the documents are similar to material related to settlement discussions and documents, which we have concluded do not carry a presumption of public access. 291

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

!d.
263 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1312.
Id.
Id. at n.10.
290.
See, e.g., Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir.
2002); Gulino v. Bd. of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of New York, No. 96 Civ.
8414 (CBM), 2003 WL 1878235, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ('"Judicial documents,' ...
are items filed with the court that are relevant to the performance of the judicial
function and useful in the judicial process.").
291. SEC v. Thestreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 233 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal citations
J
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The rise of agreed~upon "umbrella" protective orders, in
conjunction with local rules excusing filing, has left significant
amounts of material both under seal and un-filed.292 Thirdparty access is increasingly available only upon intervention
under Rule 24. In these circumstances, a good cause determination with respect to a specific document is not made until
someone challenges the arrangement, and material is never
filed until the case is subject to at least pre-trial motions.
Third-parties, consequently, have few means other than
knowledge of the action itself and their own speculation to discern whether information of public importance is being generated by a case.
The Manual for Complex Litigation provides a clear de·
scription of the procedures employed:
Umbrella orders provide that all assertedly confidential material disclosed (and appropriately identified, usually by
stamp) is presumptively protected unless challenged. Such
orders typically are made without a particularized showing
to support the claim for protection, but such a showing must
be made whenever a claim under an order is challenged.293

If such material were both filed with the court and "protected"
by virtue of nothing more than the parties own use of a stamp,
the requirements of Rule 26(c) ,a re effectively ignored. But the
litigation most likely to include voluminous discovery and consequently a willingness to permit the parties to exchange usually thousands of documents "under seal" without court involvement will often be that in which the public interest is the
highest.
Bridgestone/Firestone illustrates this conundrum. ''[l]n
what has become commonplace in the federal courts, the parties stipulated to a protective order allowing each other to designate particular documents as confidential and subject to pro-

and quotations omitted). In denying access to material submitted with only pre~
trial motions in Phillips, the Ninth Circuit stated that "it makes little sense to
render the district coures protective order useless simply hecause the plaintiffs
attached a sealed discovery document to a nondispositive sanctions motion filed
with the court." 307 F.3d at 1213.
292.
After 2000, this situation became the norm under amended Rule 5(d).
FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d) (2000).
293.
FED. JUD. CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITlG. § 11.432 (4th ed. 2004).
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tection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)7."294 Discovery in the case was not filed in accord with the court's local
rules.295 The press (including the Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, and CBS Broadcasting) intervened under Rule 24 for
the purpose of seeking access to materials obtained in discovery.296 Here, however, every document produced in discovery
had been submitted to the court in conjunction with pre .. trial
motions. 297
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court conclusion
that ''because the documents were filed with the court they are
judicial records and therefore subject to the common-law right
of access." 298
Such an approach does not distinguish between material
filed with discovery motions and material filed in connection
with more substantive motions. . . . The better rule is that
material filed with discovery motions is hot subject to the
common-law right of access, whereas discovery material
filed in connection with pretrial motions that require judicial resolution of the merits is subject to the common-law
right, and we so hold. This means that the Firestone documents filed in connection with motions to compel discovery
are not subject to the common-law right of access.299

Conversely, where pretrial material is submitted with a
dispositive motion, the presumption favors access. In Lugosch
v. Pyramid Company of Onondaga,300 the appellate court described such discovery material as subject to the ''highest" presumption of access.30I In reversing the district court, the circuit court held that the availability of such documents is
presumed upon filing; it was not proper for the district court to
hold resolution of the access decision in "abeyance" pending the
resolution of the summary judgment motion.302 While Lugosch
294.

Chicago Tribune, Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1307
(11th Cir. 2001).
295. !d. at 1308 (citing S.D. Ga. L.R. 26.6).
296. !d.
297.
ld. at 1312. The court found it "significant" that the material had been
submitted with these motions entirely by the plaintiffs, and not at all by Firestone. Id.
298.
!d.
299. Id. at 1312-13.
300.
435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006).
30 l. Id. at 123.
302. Id. at 126. The court further refused to conclude that documents submit-
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allowed access to material when used to support a judicial de-termination on the merits of a case, even this has been narrowed in other cases. Some courts have looked to ·w hether the
summary judgment motion was denied, thereby postponing the
merits decision of the case, and concluded that in such instances the presumption is not as strong.303
Even more restrictively, the Second Circuit established a
"gene.r al and strong presumption against access to documents
sealed under protective order when there was reasonable reliance upon such an order'' in Thestreet.com.304 The court
reached this conclusion despite the fact that the protective order in this case was a privately agreed upon umbrella order
lacking a.ny judicial determination of good cause.305 This suggests that private parties, in furthering their own interests,
may bar public inspection.

ted with a summary judgment motion might receive different weights of presump· ·
tion "based on the extent to which they were relied upon in resolving the motion."
ld. at 123 (citing In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum. Products
Antitrust Litig., 101 F.R.D. 34, 43 (C.D. Cal. 1984)) ("If the rationale behind access is to allow the public an opportunity to assess the correctness of the judge's
decision . . . documents that the judge should have considered or relied upon, but
did not, are just as deserving of disclosure as those that actually entered into the
judge's decision."). See also id. (citing F'l'C v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830
F.2d 404, 409 (1st Cir. 1987)) ("Once those submissions come to the attention of
the district judge, they can fairly be assumed to play a role in the court's delibera.
") .
t1ons.
303. See In re NBC Universal Inc., 426 F.Supp. 2d. 49, 53-54 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)
(quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995) ('Where a
district court denied the summary judgment motion, essentially postponing .a final
determination of substantive legal rights, the public interest in ~ccess is not as
pressing.'')); United States v. Graham, 257 F.:3d 143, 151 (2d Cir. 2001) ('~Con·
versely the presumption of access to documents that do not serve as the basis for a
substantive determination-such as documents submitted on a motion for summary judgment which is denied, thus leaving a decision on the merits for another
day-is appreciably weaker.").
304~
SEC v. Thest:r;eet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 231 (2d Cir. 2001). See also Bayer
AG and Miles, Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 162 F.R.D ~ 456, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (quoting Palmieri v. New York, 779 F.2d 861, 866 (2d Cir. 1985)); Crothers v. Pilgrim
Mortgage Corp., No. 95 CIV. 4681(SAS), 1997 WL 570583, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
11, 1997) ("[T]he Martindell standard should not apply where a private non-party
asserts its own interests to modify a sealing order for at least two reasons.").
305.
TheStreet.com; 27:3 F.3d at 225 ("Under the October 2000 Order, each
party had the right to designate material as 'confidential information' if it be·
lieved in good faith that the material should be so classified."). While the court
recognized the potential for conflicting presumptions when a party "reasonably
relies'; on discovery material subject to a protective order but later attaches it to a
dispositive motion, it avoided this issue, concluding that the parties in this case
had not reasonably relied on the protective order. Id. at 234.
'

'
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Other courts, however, have not gone this far. In Diversified Group v. Daugerdas,306 the media sought access to documents, including deposition testimony, submitted under seal by
both sides in support of and ·opposing summary judgment motions.307 The defendants objecte·d to granting access to the material. The court disagreed, holding that when the materials
are submitted to the Court for making a judicial determination
the presumption regarding discovery materials shifts.308
A comparable exception to denying access has been carved
out for similarly situated parallel litigants, traditionally allowed access to pretrial information. In In re Enron Corporation Securities, Derivative & "ERISA" Litigation,309 the court
dealt with access presumptions in light of modern electronic filing methods. Enron-related cases were consolidated under the
Multi-District Litigation transfer statute, which included the
establishment of a litigation website (the "ESL" website), accessible only by parties to the case and which served as an ele,ctronic repository of "depositions and related exhibits."310 The
Texas State Board of Public Accountancy, charged by statute
with "investigating alleged audit failures that may have led to
Enron's collapse" moved to intervene in the case to gain access
to discovery material after "some accountants . . . refused to
provide . . . copies, based on the Court's confidentiality orders."311 The court noted that pretrial discovery m,a terial carries no presumption of access and that the parties had relied
upon the court's standing orders regarding the confidentiality
of material on the ESL website.312 Nor had the documents
sought by the Texas board been filed with the court or submitted to the court in support of motions or rulings by the court.313
Intervention by the Texas board, which would have the effect of
granting the Board access to the ESL website and consequently
306.

304 F. Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
307.
ld. at 510.
308.
ld. at 515 (citing Byrnes v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, No. 98 Civ.
8520 BSJ MHD, 2000 WL 60221, at *5 (S~D. N.Y. Jan. 25, 2000) (noting an exception to the rule regarding the presumption that attaches to discovery documents
where the documents are included in summary judgment motion papers submitted to the court) (''Moreover, the Court relied upon all the materials submitted to
it in rendering its opinion on the summary judgment motion.")). ld.
309. 229 F.R.D. 126 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
310. Id. at 128..
311. ld.
312.
Id. at 128-29.
313. ld. at 128, n.5.
·.

.

.

.
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all depositions in the case, was granted because a more ~'flexi
ble" approach regarding intervention was required.31 4 "[T]he
fruits of pretrial discovery are, in the absence of a court order
to the contrary, presumptively public/'3 15 Consequently, the
Board was granted access by virtue of intervention.316 However, while the Texas Board was permitted to intervene as par ..
allel litigants, the board was also made subject to the existing
confidentiality orders, ess:e ntially continuing to shield the information from any general public access. 317
In Foltz v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Insurance Co.,318 the
district court had sealed the files and removed the entire litigation from the court's computer system.3I9 The circuit court addressed the motions for access by third parties, including a
public interest group, contesting two protective orders.320 One
protective order was a privately agreed upon blanket order
treating all discovery material as confidential.321 The appellate
court remanded, instructing the district court to "require State
Farm to show good cause under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(c) for continuing protection against the collateral litigants of
materials produced in discovery but not made part of the court
record. "322
.

.

CONCLUSION

•

Beginning in 1991, Rule 5 authorized district courts to
adopt local rules permitting filing by fax.323 In 1993, the rule
was amended to allow filing by any electronic means, not just
'
fax.324 Early on, few courts authorized electronic filing.325 The
/d.at 131.
315.
Id. at 131 (quoting San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court N.
Dist. (San Jose), 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cit. 1999)).
316.
Id.
314.

.

317.

.

Id.

331 F~3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2003).
319.
Id. at 1128.
320.
ld. at 1138. The-ftrst order concerned "the very narrow issue of whether
plaintiffs counsel should be disqualified." Id. 'T he court upheld the order, recognizing that the material was subject to the attorney-client privilege and stating
that "[w]e see no conceivable policy reason to serve up such information on a silver platter." Id.
321.
ld.
322.
Id. at 1139.
323.
FED. R. CIV. P. 5(e) (1992); 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE§ 5.31(l][b] (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2005).
324.
FED. R. CIV. P. 5(e) (2000).
318.

•
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federal courts are now rapidly being equipped with technology
that can accommodate electronic filing.326 Effective December
2006, Rule 5 was amended to authorize. electronic filing of all
papers.3 2 7
The Advisory Committee commented on this change:
·" Amended Rule 5(e) acknowledges that many courts hav·e required electronic filing by means of a standing order, procedures manual, or local rule. These local practices reflect the
advantages that courts and most litigants realize from electronic filing.''328
The Case Management/Electronic Case Files ("CM/ECF')
system gives federal courts the ability to maintain electronic
cas.e files and offer electronic filing of court documents. 329 This
system allows both attorneys and the public to view court
dockets and case files online. 330 Each court determines for itself to whom it will issue filing logins and passwords.33I Although individuals may not be allowed to file. on CM/ECF,-they
may still be able to view CM/ECF files through the Public Access to Court Electronic Records ("PACER") program.332 However, some courts restrict online viewing as well.333
The implementation of electronic filing in the federal
courts produces marked advantages over paper filing.334 Elec-

325.
326.

MOORE ET AL., supra note 322, § 5.31[2][a].
ld~·

327.

Supreme Court Approves Rule Changes on E-Discovery, Unpublished
Opinion Citation, 74 U.S. L. WK. 2617 (2006).
328. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2005/CV_Rule_5e. pdf (last visited Feb.
18, 2007). On April 12, 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court submitted amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to Congress. See http://www.supremecourt
us.gov/orders/courtorders/ftcv06p.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
329.
CMIECF Frequently Asked Questions, www.uscourts.gov/cmecf/cmecf_
faqs.html (last visited Feb~ 18, 2007)~
330.
Id.
331.
Id.
332.
ld.
333.
MOORE ET AL., supra note 8, § 5.31[7][c]. Courts do not have to make files
available online, as long as the public is able to physically access records from the
courthouse. ld. § 5.34[3][d].
334.
LEONIDAS MECHAM~ ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ELECTRONIC
CASE FILES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF GOALS,
ISSUES, AND THE ROAD AHEAD 3 (1997) (Discussion Draft), http://www.uscourts.
gov/casefiles/ecfmar97.pdf. Problems noted with the paper filing system included
the following: paper files are cumbersome to organize, difficult to retrieve quickly,
and are subject to the access limitations of normal business hours; paper files are
usually only available to one person at a time, limiting the ability of a panel of
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tronic filing improves judge, court staff, and public access to
case files; decreases court costs through increased productivity
and efficiency; reduces physical handling, maintenance, and
copying of files; improves docketing, scheduling, case management, and statistical reporting; and enhances accuracy and efficiency in record maintenance.335 Furthermore, the newly
adopted amendments to the civil rules will increase efficiency
in the discovery of electronically stored information.336
Prior to implementing CM/ECF, the Judicial Conference
studied privacy and public access issues relevant to electronic
filing. The concern regarding privacy was that court participants would be subject to an increased risk of "identity theft,
stalking, and predatory business practices" due to the ease of
access and increase in accessible information.337 To address
this concern, the Judicial Conference had its Committee on
Court Administration and Case Management examine issues
relating to privacy and public access to electronic case files.338
The committee, through its Subcommittee on Privacy and Public Access to Electronic Case Files, began its study in June 1999
and received information from experts and academics in the
privacy arena, as well as judges, clerks, and government agen-

judges of their clerks to access or work on files at home; and paper files require
multiple copies to file, distribute, maintain and store, all of which must be done
manually with a risk that files will be lost or misfiled. ld.
335. Judge Arthur Monty Ahalt, JusticeLINK, Prince George's County, Maryland
Electronic
Filing
Pilot,
http://www.ncsc.dni.us/NCSC/TIS/TIS99/
CTC6/JudgesSuper/CTC6SuperEfiling.htm Oast visited Jan. 17, 2003) (on file
with author).
336. Id.
337. Witnesses Advocate Balanced Approach For Federal Courts' Document Access Plan, 69 U.S. L. WK. 2576 (2001). In 2005, an article analyzed the state of
electronic filing in the U.S. federal courts and offered judges advice on handling
electronic filing. David K. Isom, Electronic Discovery Primer for Judges, 2005
FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, http://www.fclr.org/articles/2005fedctslrevl(noframes).htm.
The article addressed the tension between secrecy and public access regarding
electronically filed discovery. ld. at 30. Isom did not address whether discovery
material must be filed; rather, he emphasized that courts must balance the competing interests of secrecy and access. Id. at 31. Because of electronic filing,
"[l]itigants will be even more reluctant to file information that they know may become instantly accessible and distributable throughout the world. The press, the
public and information vendors will also find the information more valuable and
useful. Courts will be asked to be the arbiters of these intense competing interests." ld.
338. Jud .Conf. Comm. on Court Admin. and Case Mgmt., Report on Privacy
and Public Access to Electronic Case Files (2001), http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/
Policy.htm [hereinafter Judicial Committee Report].
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cies. 339 The subcommittee re_c ommended that documents in
civil case files be made available electronically to the same extent that they are available at the courthouse.340 The Judicial
Conference has adopted these recommendations, but they are
not binding on the courts. 341 The experience of those courts
that have been making their case file information available
through PACERNet is that there have been virtually nd reported privacy problems as a result.''342 CM/ECF systems are
now in use in 89% of federal courts, including 88 of the 94 district courts.343
These technological changes make clear that issues _a bout
access to pretrial information gathered by discovery should be
evaluated on the merits, not on the basis of spurious claims of
burden upon clerks' offices. There can be honest disagreement
on whether the public should have access to this information.
My view is that legitimate concerns about privacy, business interests, and other considerations may be dealt with by federal
courts in the same manner as they now routinely handle these
issues under protective order requests. Unfortunately, the
2000 amendment to Rule 5(d) has short circuited this debate.
We should now move toward reasoned arguments to decide this
important question.

339.

Id.

340.
!d. However, the subcommittee recommended that Social Security cases
be excluded from electronic access and that personal identifiers (such as social se_c urity numbers, dates of birth, financial account numbers, and na,mes of minors)
be modified or partially redacted. Id.
341. About CM/ECF, supra note 329.
342.
Judicial Committee Report, supra note 338.
343.
About CM/ECF, supra note 329.

